This sounds to me very strongly like a rejection of utilitarianism, not of consequentialism.
Presumably you don’t have ontologically basic objections to a conspiracy of murder doctors because “conspiracy” “murder” and “doctor” are all not ontologically basic. And you aren’t saying “this is wrong because murder is wrong” or “this is wrong because they are bad people for doing it.” You’re saying “this is wrong because it results in a bad world-state.”
Consequentialism only requires a partial ordering of worlds, not a metric; and satisficing under uncertainty over a family of possible utility functions or similar probably looks a lot more like usual good behavior.
I do agree that there are “no real world utilitarians” in the sense of having certainty in a specific utility function though, with Peter Singer being the possible exception and also looking kind of like a bond villain.
This sounds to me very strongly like a rejection of utilitarianism, not of consequentialism.
Presumably you don’t have ontologically basic objections to a conspiracy of murder doctors because “conspiracy” “murder” and “doctor” are all not ontologically basic. And you aren’t saying “this is wrong because murder is wrong” or “this is wrong because they are bad people for doing it.” You’re saying “this is wrong because it results in a bad world-state.”
Consequentialism only requires a partial ordering of worlds, not a metric; and satisficing under uncertainty over a family of possible utility functions or similar probably looks a lot more like usual good behavior.
I do agree that there are “no real world utilitarians” in the sense of having certainty in a specific utility function though, with Peter Singer being the possible exception and also looking kind of like a bond villain.