Well, the original said you could only not fund the legal defense; I don’t see anything there stopping you from putting the bums up in a hotel or something during the lawsuits.
But even if defendants were required to spend the same as the plaintiff, we still run into the issue I already mentioned: So now I simply need to put up 5 or 10k for each bum, guaranteeing me a very crappy legal team but also guaranteeing my target a very crappy legal team.
The less competent the 2 lawyers are, the more the case becomes a role of the dice. (Imagine taking it down to the extreme where the lawyers are so stupid or incompetent they are replaceable by random number generators.) The most unpredictable chess game in the world is between the 2 rankest amateurs, not the current World Champion and #2.
But maybe your frivolous win-rate remains the same regardless of whether you put in 10k or a few million. There’s still a problem: people already use frivolous lawsuits as weapons: forcing discovery, intrusive subpoenas, the sheer hassle, and so on. Those people, and many more, would regard this as a massive enhancement of lawsuits as a weapon.
You have an enemy? File a lawsuit, put in 20k, say, and now you can tell your crappy lawyer to spend an hour on it every so often just to keep it kicking. If your target blows his allotted 20k trying to get the lawsuit ended despite your delaying & harassing tactics, now you can sic your lawyer on the undefended target; if he measures out his budget to avoid this, then he has given into suffering this death of a thousand cuts. And if he goes without? As they say, someone who represents himself in court has a fool for a client....
Well, a lot of what you’re pointing out here is the result of other systemic problems that need other systemic fixes. Judges may not be fast enough to toss out foolish complaints. One might need a two-tier system whereby cheap lawyers and reasonably sane judges could quickly toss almost all the lawsuits, and any that make it past the first bar can get more expensive lawyers. One may need a basic cost of a dismissed suit to the litigant, or some higher degree of loser-pays.
Lawsuits are already weapons. This isn’t obviously a massive enhancement. At most, it increases costs by a factor of 2 for rich defendants, while greatly improving (if it works as planned!) the position of poor defendants.
Lawsuits are already weapons. This isn’t obviously a massive enhancement. At most, it increases costs by a factor of 2 for rich defendants, while greatly improving (if it works as planned!) the position of poor defendants.
OK. So the English rule is a weakened version of this; we should expect to see great improvements from it, since between it and contingency-fees and class-actions, poor defendants have much greater financial wherewithal than their poverty would allow. Do we see great improvements? If we don’t, why would we expect your full-strength treatment to work?
And if we can’t justify it on any empirical grounds, why on earth would you put it forward on theoretical grounds when a minute’s thought shows multiple issues with it, to say nothing of how one would actually enforce equitable spending? (The issue would seem to be as difficult & tricky as enforcing campaign finance laws...) And if I, an utter layman to the law, can come up with flaws you seem to acknowledge as real, how many ways could a legal eagle come up with to abuse it?
Well, a lot of what you’re pointing out here is the result of other systemic problems that need other systemic fixes.
“She said that instead of a flashy and expensive public awareness campaign, the real solution was for binge drinkers to take responsibility for their own actions and learn that there were ways to have fun that didn’t involve alcohol.
This struck me as a misguided line of thinking. Consider this analogy: pretend that the city government was, instead, increasing the number of police to prevent terrorist attacks. And that the writer was arguing that no, we shouldn’t get the police involved: the real solution was for terrorists to stop being so violent and attacking people. This would be a weird and completely useless response.”
Well, the original said you could only not fund the legal defense; I don’t see anything there stopping you from putting the bums up in a hotel or something during the lawsuits.
But even if defendants were required to spend the same as the plaintiff, we still run into the issue I already mentioned: So now I simply need to put up 5 or 10k for each bum, guaranteeing me a very crappy legal team but also guaranteeing my target a very crappy legal team.
The less competent the 2 lawyers are, the more the case becomes a role of the dice. (Imagine taking it down to the extreme where the lawyers are so stupid or incompetent they are replaceable by random number generators.) The most unpredictable chess game in the world is between the 2 rankest amateurs, not the current World Champion and #2.
But maybe your frivolous win-rate remains the same regardless of whether you put in 10k or a few million. There’s still a problem: people already use frivolous lawsuits as weapons: forcing discovery, intrusive subpoenas, the sheer hassle, and so on. Those people, and many more, would regard this as a massive enhancement of lawsuits as a weapon.
You have an enemy? File a lawsuit, put in 20k, say, and now you can tell your crappy lawyer to spend an hour on it every so often just to keep it kicking. If your target blows his allotted 20k trying to get the lawsuit ended despite your delaying & harassing tactics, now you can sic your lawyer on the undefended target; if he measures out his budget to avoid this, then he has given into suffering this death of a thousand cuts. And if he goes without? As they say, someone who represents himself in court has a fool for a client....
Well, a lot of what you’re pointing out here is the result of other systemic problems that need other systemic fixes. Judges may not be fast enough to toss out foolish complaints. One might need a two-tier system whereby cheap lawyers and reasonably sane judges could quickly toss almost all the lawsuits, and any that make it past the first bar can get more expensive lawyers. One may need a basic cost of a dismissed suit to the litigant, or some higher degree of loser-pays.
Lawsuits are already weapons. This isn’t obviously a massive enhancement. At most, it increases costs by a factor of 2 for rich defendants, while greatly improving (if it works as planned!) the position of poor defendants.
OK. So the English rule is a weakened version of this; we should expect to see great improvements from it, since between it and contingency-fees and class-actions, poor defendants have much greater financial wherewithal than their poverty would allow. Do we see great improvements? If we don’t, why would we expect your full-strength treatment to work?
And if we can’t justify it on any empirical grounds, why on earth would you put it forward on theoretical grounds when a minute’s thought shows multiple issues with it, to say nothing of how one would actually enforce equitable spending? (The issue would seem to be as difficult & tricky as enforcing campaign finance laws...) And if I, an utter layman to the law, can come up with flaws you seem to acknowledge as real, how many ways could a legal eagle come up with to abuse it?
That’s pretty lame. Reminds me of Yvain’s “Solutions to Political Problems As Counterfactuals”: