I think one thing this post fails to take into account is the difference between endorsed, professed, conscious beliefs, vs. unconscious aliefs. I suspect the “morals as a convenience” theory is actually talking about the latter type of belief, while the “factual advocacy” approach is more focused on the former.
While it is true that factual advocacy can affect unconscious aliefs, there are much more effective ways to do so, many pioneered and testing in the field of marketing, which in many ways can be seen as a study of how to effect people’s aliefs such that they change their actions.
I am going to make a bold claim: traditional marketing strategies are succesful due to poorly understood rational incentives they create.
In other words: they are succesful because they give factual knowledge of cheap opportunities to purchase status or other social commodities, not because they change our aliefs.
Under other light, the marketing success evidence supports the morality-as-schelling-point-selector in Qiaochu’s comment above.
I think one thing this post fails to take into account is the difference between endorsed, professed, conscious beliefs, vs. unconscious aliefs. I suspect the “morals as a convenience” theory is actually talking about the latter type of belief, while the “factual advocacy” approach is more focused on the former.
While it is true that factual advocacy can affect unconscious aliefs, there are much more effective ways to do so, many pioneered and testing in the field of marketing, which in many ways can be seen as a study of how to effect people’s aliefs such that they change their actions.
I am going to make a bold claim: traditional marketing strategies are succesful due to poorly understood rational incentives they create.
In other words: they are succesful because they give factual knowledge of cheap opportunities to purchase status or other social commodities, not because they change our aliefs.
Under other light, the marketing success evidence supports the morality-as-schelling-point-selector in Qiaochu’s comment above.