It’s empirically wrong: my experiences have been highly ordered in the past and so I expect them to be ordered in the future, and not to jump randomly around the universe just because there exist embodiments of every possible future state I might experience.
Just because the encoding of the different states are scattered about the universe doesn’t mean the conscious experience does not appear to be contiguous and linear to the observer; while they’d be in the minority in an infinite configuration space it is impossible that there won’t be states without memories of contiguous experiences.
Also, I agree. Based on our experiences we can conclude that we are not dust-minds.
Could either of you explain how you would expect your current state of consciousness with its memories of experiences to be any different from how it is now if it were a dust-mind?
Of course it wouldn’t be different at all. But what matters is that my current state of consciousness would be extremely unlikely for a dust mind. This doesn’t totally rule out the possibility but it basically puts it in the same category as every other skeptical thesis.
And actually it is probably worse than the other skeptical theses since it includes some really weird assumptions about information and causation, as far as I can tell.
Just because the encoding of the different states are scattered about the universe doesn’t mean the conscious experience does not appear to be contiguous and linear to the observer; while they’d be in the minority in an infinite configuration space it is impossible that there won’t be states without memories of contiguous experiences.
Could either of you explain how you would expect your current state of consciousness with its memories of experiences to be any different from how it is now if it were a dust-mind?
Of course it wouldn’t be different at all. But what matters is that my current state of consciousness would be extremely unlikely for a dust mind. This doesn’t totally rule out the possibility but it basically puts it in the same category as every other skeptical thesis.
And actually it is probably worse than the other skeptical theses since it includes some really weird assumptions about information and causation, as far as I can tell.
It is extremely unlikely, but in an unbounded configuration space it simply has to happen, and to happen many times.