It’s basically modal realism for compsci geeks. In a universe without ontologically fundamental mental things, we can’t perceive reality directly; our thoughts are implemented in brains. But then, once you concede that thoughts are implemented somehow, it seems to follow that there’s no way to tell that you’re not actually being implemented in a computer situation. And if you buy some strong Machian principles, you start thinking, well, if I can’t possibly tell whether or not I’m in a simulation or the “real world,” then maybe there is no fact of the matter. Maybe the universe is just pure information, all possible programs, all possible mathematical structures, and I’m an observer that just happens to find itself embedded in the “dust” of random bits. Cf. Tegmark level IV.
I haven’t read Permutation City, but that’s pretty much my view of reality. I don’t think there’s a meaningful difference between “the real world” and a perfect simulation of it (at least seen “from the inside”) - the same way a chess configuration is the same whether it’s played on a computer or on a real chessboard today or on a real chessboard a couple centuries ago. Does the rook agonize about whether he’s a real rook or a simulation? Does it mean something to him?
I agree, and say we are in a simulation. I’m not sure what the precise definition of ‘simulation’ is, but it should be a broad enough concept to include the universe, whatever the universe is. The universe may not be a directed simulation, it may not be a simulation that has a beginning and an end, and even the continuity of it may be a complete illusion. But I cannot imagine how anything at a sufficient level of detail could be interpreted as not a simulation; that is, as something that isn’t computed or doesn’t run with some mix of mechanical and random rules.
In the context of the point of view that everything is a ‘simulation’, if “actual reality” is fragmented or in any other way fundamentally really, really different from my subjective experience, I don’t care. I care about understanding the reality of the simulation I’m in. I only care about any reality outside the simulation to the extent it affects my simulation. And I believe I’m thoroughly justified in this focus of interest. If everything is a simulation, why should simulation B nested within larger simulation A be less “real” than A? I have no evidence that simulation B is fragile or inconsistent, so that I need to be prepared for A tomorrow.
If Nemo told me today that this world is The Matrix, I would be very excited at first, but I would also temper my excitement until he answered my question whether any of the rules are different inside the simulation than what we thought. If there’s no magic, no way to get the simulation to do something cool, then ultimately it just wouldn’t make a difference. Reality is as real as it ever was.
A ‘less real’ reality is only a reality that is inconsistent, that provides evidence of a parent reality that is arbitrarily manipulating the simulation in some way. Thus finally, I would define a simulation as “subjectively unreal” only if the simulation is impossible for the subjects to model without a model of the parent.
don’t think there’s a meaningful difference between “the real world” and a perfect simulation of it (at least seen “from the inside”) -
What’s the meaning of meaningful? Do you mean that you literally cannot understand the opposite of simulationism? Or are using “meaningful” to mean “empirically confirmable”? The empirical indetectability of a simulation follows from simulations premises, right enough....but it cannot be used to argue for them.
I mean, roughly, that not only are the two empircally indistinguishable, but that I don’t even see a reason to care about whether I’m “in a simulation” or not, and it’s not even clear what would qualify as a simulation...
I mean, roughly, that not only are the two empircally indistinguishable,
Don’t you mean “have been indistinguishable up to time T”
but that I don’t even see a reason to care about whether I’m “in a simulation” or not, and it’s not even clear what would qualify as a simulation..
Simulations support counterfactuals, such as shutdowns. getting out into the real world, etc.
If we’re given assurances that things you might care about, such as being abruptly halted, aren’t going to happen, then you might have nothing further to care about....but it is difficult to see what such assurances would consist of,
I mean, I don’t either but I can’t think of a rational reason not to.
Also we should note that it doesn’t even really matter if you are running in a computer simulation; your conscious state could be encoded in anything with enough detail structure to represent your entire state for a particular time slice. Whether there is an encoding for prior or latter time slices isn’t even important.
Its easiest to work up to this by starting with “mind uploading” and then playing games with the information such as pausing it, rewinding it, removing time slices etc. Thats pretty much the first couple chapters of the novel.
It’s basically modal realism for compsci geeks. In a universe without ontologically fundamental mental things, we can’t perceive reality directly; our thoughts are implemented in brains. But then, once you concede that thoughts are implemented somehow, it seems to follow that there’s no way to tell that you’re not actually being implemented in a computer situation. And if you buy some strong Machian principles, you start thinking, well, if I can’t possibly tell whether or not I’m in a simulation or the “real world,” then maybe there is no fact of the matter. Maybe the universe is just pure information, all possible programs, all possible mathematical structures, and I’m an observer that just happens to find itself embedded in the “dust” of random bits. Cf. Tegmark level IV.
ADDENDUM—Yeah, I don’t buy it, either.
I haven’t read Permutation City, but that’s pretty much my view of reality. I don’t think there’s a meaningful difference between “the real world” and a perfect simulation of it (at least seen “from the inside”) - the same way a chess configuration is the same whether it’s played on a computer or on a real chessboard today or on a real chessboard a couple centuries ago. Does the rook agonize about whether he’s a real rook or a simulation? Does it mean something to him?
I agree, and say we are in a simulation. I’m not sure what the precise definition of ‘simulation’ is, but it should be a broad enough concept to include the universe, whatever the universe is. The universe may not be a directed simulation, it may not be a simulation that has a beginning and an end, and even the continuity of it may be a complete illusion. But I cannot imagine how anything at a sufficient level of detail could be interpreted as not a simulation; that is, as something that isn’t computed or doesn’t run with some mix of mechanical and random rules.
In the context of the point of view that everything is a ‘simulation’, if “actual reality” is fragmented or in any other way fundamentally really, really different from my subjective experience, I don’t care. I care about understanding the reality of the simulation I’m in. I only care about any reality outside the simulation to the extent it affects my simulation. And I believe I’m thoroughly justified in this focus of interest. If everything is a simulation, why should simulation B nested within larger simulation A be less “real” than A? I have no evidence that simulation B is fragile or inconsistent, so that I need to be prepared for A tomorrow.
If Nemo told me today that this world is The Matrix, I would be very excited at first, but I would also temper my excitement until he answered my question whether any of the rules are different inside the simulation than what we thought. If there’s no magic, no way to get the simulation to do something cool, then ultimately it just wouldn’t make a difference. Reality is as real as it ever was.
A ‘less real’ reality is only a reality that is inconsistent, that provides evidence of a parent reality that is arbitrarily manipulating the simulation in some way. Thus finally, I would define a simulation as “subjectively unreal” only if the simulation is impossible for the subjects to model without a model of the parent.
Nemo?
Are you referring to some kind of Matrix/Finding Nemo fanfic?
Made me think more of Jules Vernes’ original Captain Nemo...
Haha! “Neo”. Just one letter difference, jeez!
What’s the meaning of meaningful? Do you mean that you literally cannot understand the opposite of simulationism? Or are using “meaningful” to mean “empirically confirmable”? The empirical indetectability of a simulation follows from simulations premises, right enough....but it cannot be used to argue for them.
I mean, roughly, that not only are the two empircally indistinguishable, but that I don’t even see a reason to care about whether I’m “in a simulation” or not, and it’s not even clear what would qualify as a simulation...
Don’t you mean “have been indistinguishable up to time T”
Simulations support counterfactuals, such as shutdowns. getting out into the real world, etc.
If we’re given assurances that things you might care about, such as being abruptly halted, aren’t going to happen, then you might have nothing further to care about....but it is difficult to see what such assurances would consist of,
Care to share why you don’t buy it?
I mean, I don’t either but I can’t think of a rational reason not to.
Also we should note that it doesn’t even really matter if you are running in a computer simulation; your conscious state could be encoded in anything with enough detail structure to represent your entire state for a particular time slice. Whether there is an encoding for prior or latter time slices isn’t even important.
Its easiest to work up to this by starting with “mind uploading” and then playing games with the information such as pausing it, rewinding it, removing time slices etc. Thats pretty much the first couple chapters of the novel.