Basically, for objectivists (with respect to morals), having some other morality is wrong. For relativists it’s merely different. The former is a much stronger cause for intervention than the latter.
Also, willingness to insist on your morality is generally a sign of taking it seriously.
The correlation between moral objectivism and interventionism is probably true, but I think it’s historically contingent, and not a logical consequence of objectivism. Whether or not I think of my morality as objective (universal) or subjective (a property of myself), that’s orthogonal to what I actually think is moral.
I’m a moral relativist. My morality is that torture and murder are wrong and I am justified and, indeed, sometimes enjoined to use force to stop them. I don’t think this is an uncommon stand.
Other people are moral objectivists, but their actual morals may tell them to leave others alone except in self-defense.
It’s relevant because it determines whether the question matters. If some dude somewhere finds my behaviour immoral, I couldn’t care less. If the same dude decides he needs to do something about it, we’ll have to solve this disagreement somehow.
imposing one’s morals on another would be wrong
No, not wrong. But having a different set of consequences.
It’s relevant because it determines whether the question matters.
Then it seems clear to me that the question shouldn’t matter to you. Objectivists may be interventionists at a higher rate than relativists, but that bears no relation to which position is true.
No, not wrong. But having a different set of consequences.
That set of consequences being unpreferred, presumably. What is that if not an expression of (relative) wrongness?
Not wrongness as a property of the wine no. But given knowledge of my preference and all else being equal, would it not be wrong to give me white over red?
Empirically that is not so. There are major world religions based on the fact that everyone should hold the one true belief and accord with its god-given morality. Followers of such religions profess, and those of the evangelist variety follow through with imposing their morals on others and believing it is the right thing to do.
Somewhat more secular is, say, the belief in equal rights for women or minorities. Lots of people on both sides have strong views about forced wearing of the hajib in some muslim countries. Advocating for woman in Saudi Arabia to have the right to drive, when you don’t live in or have any connection to that region of the world is trying to enforce one’s morals on another, right?
Actually, the point of contention is whether calling moral ideas “true” or “false” is a category error.
Agreed. Hence “if any”. So why start talking about imposing morals?
Basically, for objectivists (with respect to morals), having some other morality is wrong. For relativists it’s merely different. The former is a much stronger cause for intervention than the latter.
Also, willingness to insist on your morality is generally a sign of taking it seriously.
The correlation between moral objectivism and interventionism is probably true, but I think it’s historically contingent, and not a logical consequence of objectivism. Whether or not I think of my morality as objective (universal) or subjective (a property of myself), that’s orthogonal to what I actually think is moral.
I’m a moral relativist. My morality is that torture and murder are wrong and I am justified and, indeed, sometimes enjoined to use force to stop them. I don’t think this is an uncommon stand.
Other people are moral objectivists, but their actual morals may tell them to leave others alone except in self-defense.
I don’t disagree in any regard. I still fail to see how this is relevant to the admitted point of contention;
As an aside, I infer that you think imposing one’s morals on another would be wrong. Is that not a moral absolute itself?
It’s relevant because it determines whether the question matters. If some dude somewhere finds my behaviour immoral, I couldn’t care less. If the same dude decides he needs to do something about it, we’ll have to solve this disagreement somehow.
No, not wrong. But having a different set of consequences.
Then it seems clear to me that the question shouldn’t matter to you. Objectivists may be interventionists at a higher rate than relativists, but that bears no relation to which position is true.
That set of consequences being unpreferred, presumably. What is that if not an expression of (relative) wrongness?
If you prefer red wine over white, that is not an expression of white wine’s wrongness.
Not wrongness as a property of the wine no. But given knowledge of my preference and all else being equal, would it not be wrong to give me white over red?
You are mixing up two meanings of wrong:
morally wrong (approximately = evil)
not suited to
Serving white wine with steak might well be wrong in the not appropriate sense, but it is not wrong in the moral sense.
No. I assert that it would be (mildly) evil of you to give me white wine, given knowledge of my preference for red and equal availability.
It might be under certain moral systems. It’s probably not under other moral systems. It almost certainly depends a lot on the context.
Empirically that is not so. There are major world religions based on the fact that everyone should hold the one true belief and accord with its god-given morality. Followers of such religions profess, and those of the evangelist variety follow through with imposing their morals on others and believing it is the right thing to do.
Somewhat more secular is, say, the belief in equal rights for women or minorities. Lots of people on both sides have strong views about forced wearing of the hajib in some muslim countries. Advocating for woman in Saudi Arabia to have the right to drive, when you don’t live in or have any connection to that region of the world is trying to enforce one’s morals on another, right?