Don’t. Use. Counterfactuals. Period. They are a tempting but misguided idea. They are about changing the unchangeable past, and you want to affect the future.
Reformulate your question in terms of possible decisions, not impossible ones.
Instead of asking “what would the system do if we did X?” ask “what will the system do in a similar setup if I do X?” Since you don’t yet know the future, the question is well posed, as you performing a similar experiment is in the realm of possibility. So there are no counterfactuals, only possible factuals.
I dislike the model of “causality” to begin with, except as used by Hawking and Ellis in their book on General relativity, “Large-scale structure of spacetime”, where they describe causal patches of spacetime as those where one can construct at least a finite Cauchy development of an initial hypersurface (known as global hyperbolicity).
But if you feel like, you can use those causal graphs beloved by the FDT people and say something like “if I take this setup and change the resistor, I will measure the following current and voltage.” There you claim causality about your own actions, not about the circuit, avoiding the confusion you end up in otherwise. To make this prediction you can use a convenient model, such as current source or voltage source, without claiming any cause and effect except as an internal to the model itself. You can talk about “natural abstractions” all day long, for some people they are natural and for others they are not. Reality has no joints, it just is, the “reality joints” are in the map.
Not using counterfactuals is not an option. The ultimate aim of this work is to build foundations for a reductive version of game theory, and in game theory, expected off-equilibrium behavior (a.k.a. counterfactual behavior) matters. Even if we’re going to avoid asking counterfactual questions, the agents in our models cannot avoid asking counterfactual questions, so we need a theory which lets them do so.
Typical example: kidnapper takes a child, and threatens to shoot them if a ransom is not paid. The parents are going to pay the ransom, but in order to make that decision, they need to think about the counterfactual in which they don’t pay—they need to have beliefs about that counterfactual. Likewise, when deciding whether to kidnap the child in the first place, the kidnapper has to consider the counterfactual in which he does/doesn’t do so.
Typical example: kidnapper takes a child, and threatens to shoot them if a ransom is not paid. The parents are going to pay the ransom, but in order to make that decision, they need to think about the counterfactual in which they don’t pay—they need to have beliefs about that counterfactual.
Uh. A counterfactual is “what would have been if...”, not about what may or may not come to pass. Your example is about possible futures (to kidnap or not to kidnap, or to pay ransom or not to pay ransom), so there is no issue there. From SEP:
counterfactual modality [...] concerns what is not, but could or would have been.
Remember the topic is *reductive* agency. The parents and the kinapper are all made of atoms. For our purposes, they’re deterministic. They will, in fact, only take one of the “possible” actions. The other actions are counterfactual.
I don’t think you are using the standard definition of a counterfactual. Future possibilities are never counterfactual. Unless MIRI has its own non-standard definition.
At a guess, those in favor of counterfactuals hold that the sense in which multiple things can happen (in the future) is also the sense in which counterfactuals could have happened.
Would a quantum random number generator that is as likely to output “0” as “1″ help? (It seems like there is a meaningful sense for such things that “this set up has a prior probability distribution which exists”—as opposed to a (deterministic) coin flip.).
At a guess, those in favor of counterfactuals hold that the sense in which multiple things can happen (in the future) is also the sense in which counterfactuals could have happened.
I understand that this is a tempting thought, but ultimately counterproductive. Future, whether set or not, is yet unknown. You can also evaluate probabilities of events that are unknown to you but have already happened. What I find useless is the reasoning of the type “I know that X happened, but what if it didn’t, all else being equal?”
Let’s, think of a use for it. For instance, if an outcome depends on a decision you made, considering what would have happened if you made a different decision can help refine your decision making processes.
Instead of asking “what would the system do if we did X?” ask “what will the system do in a similar setup
Methodologically, these are identical. The model or equation you are using to explore counterfactual or future states does not know or care whether the input conditions gave occurred or not. So your actual objection is about the metaphysics. On the assumption that the time is deterministic , the counterfactual could not have occurred. (The assumption that the past is fixed is not enough) You feel uncomfortable about dealing with falsehoods, even though it is possible, and sometimes useful.
It can be identical. Or it can be of the type of “What if Martin Luther King had died when he was stabbed in 1958” (from SEP), which is of little value except for alt history novels.
Don’t. Use. Counterfactuals. Period. They are a tempting but misguided idea. They are about changing the unchangeable past, and you want to affect the future.
Reformulate your question in terms of possible decisions, not impossible ones.
Instead of asking “what would the system do if we did X?” ask “what will the system do in a similar setup if I do X?” Since you don’t yet know the future, the question is well posed, as you performing a similar experiment is in the realm of possibility. So there are no counterfactuals, only possible factuals.
I dislike the model of “causality” to begin with, except as used by Hawking and Ellis in their book on General relativity, “Large-scale structure of spacetime”, where they describe causal patches of spacetime as those where one can construct at least a finite Cauchy development of an initial hypersurface (known as global hyperbolicity).
But if you feel like, you can use those causal graphs beloved by the FDT people and say something like “if I take this setup and change the resistor, I will measure the following current and voltage.” There you claim causality about your own actions, not about the circuit, avoiding the confusion you end up in otherwise. To make this prediction you can use a convenient model, such as current source or voltage source, without claiming any cause and effect except as an internal to the model itself. You can talk about “natural abstractions” all day long, for some people they are natural and for others they are not. Reality has no joints, it just is, the “reality joints” are in the map.
Not using counterfactuals is not an option. The ultimate aim of this work is to build foundations for a reductive version of game theory, and in game theory, expected off-equilibrium behavior (a.k.a. counterfactual behavior) matters. Even if we’re going to avoid asking counterfactual questions, the agents in our models cannot avoid asking counterfactual questions, so we need a theory which lets them do so.
Typical example: kidnapper takes a child, and threatens to shoot them if a ransom is not paid. The parents are going to pay the ransom, but in order to make that decision, they need to think about the counterfactual in which they don’t pay—they need to have beliefs about that counterfactual. Likewise, when deciding whether to kidnap the child in the first place, the kidnapper has to consider the counterfactual in which he does/doesn’t do so.
Uh. A counterfactual is “what would have been if...”, not about what may or may not come to pass. Your example is about possible futures (to kidnap or not to kidnap, or to pay ransom or not to pay ransom), so there is no issue there. From SEP:
Maybe you have a better example?
Remember the topic is *reductive* agency. The parents and the kinapper are all made of atoms. For our purposes, they’re deterministic. They will, in fact, only take one of the “possible” actions. The other actions are counterfactual.
I don’t think you are using the standard definition of a counterfactual. Future possibilities are never counterfactual. Unless MIRI has its own non-standard definition.
At a guess, those in favor of counterfactuals hold that the sense in which multiple things can happen (in the future) is also the sense in which counterfactuals could have happened.
Would a quantum random number generator that is as likely to output “0” as “1″ help? (It seems like there is a meaningful sense for such things that “this set up has a prior probability distribution which exists”—as opposed to a (deterministic) coin flip.).
I understand that this is a tempting thought, but ultimately counterproductive. Future, whether set or not, is yet unknown. You can also evaluate probabilities of events that are unknown to you but have already happened. What I find useless is the reasoning of the type “I know that X happened, but what if it didn’t, all else being equal?”
Let’s, think of a use for it. For instance, if an outcome depends on a decision you made, considering what would have happened if you made a different decision can help refine your decision making processes.
“Considering what may happen in a similar setup in the future if you make a different decision can help refine your decision making processes. ” FTFY
… Prompted by what did or didn’t work on the past.
Yep, definitely based on what worked and what didn’t. But future-oriented, not past-oriented.
Methodologically, these are identical. The model or equation you are using to explore counterfactual or future states does not know or care whether the input conditions gave occurred or not. So your actual objection is about the metaphysics. On the assumption that the time is deterministic , the counterfactual could not have occurred. (The assumption that the past is fixed is not enough) You feel uncomfortable about dealing with falsehoods, even though it is possible, and sometimes useful.
It can be identical. Or it can be of the type of “What if Martin Luther King had died when he was stabbed in 1958” (from SEP), which is of little value except for alt history novels.