Ah, here we are! And another! Not silly enough to actually use 0.5 as the prior, but then these are the sophisticated versions—or at least lengthy.
Another anecdote of the currency of “Bayes, P(God)=0.5”: Armondikov at RationalWiki also ranted recently on his FB (else I’d link it) about theists who’ve discovered the word “Bayes” and start at 0.5.
The important phenomenon to note here is the word “Bayes” achieving currency amongst the not joined-up of thinking, as an excuse for stupidity. Good thing or bad thing?
Most likely a bad thing, given similar past examples. E.g. I’ve talked to atheists who won’t touch Bostrom/Anthropic Bias because they associate “the anthropic principle” with theological fine-tuning arguments. And the general problem of audiences’ first impression of Bayes being that it’s just another clever way to argue for whatever you want to believe or want others to believe.
On the other hand, it would be interesting to have more debates between theists and atheists who are both familiar with Bayes and use it explicitly, if the atheist is good enough at noticing and explaining flawed uses of it, so audiences can become familiar with fallacious uses of it and see that it can be used wisely.
Ah, here we are! And another! Not silly enough to actually use 0.5 as the prior, but then these are the sophisticated versions—or at least lengthy.
Another anecdote of the currency of “Bayes, P(God)=0.5”: Armondikov at RationalWiki also ranted recently on his FB (else I’d link it) about theists who’ve discovered the word “Bayes” and start at 0.5.
Rejoinder to them is at http://lesswrong.com/lw/jp/occams_razor/ and http://lesswrong.com/lw/19m/privileging_the_hypothesis/.
The important phenomenon to note here is the word “Bayes” achieving currency amongst the not joined-up of thinking, as an excuse for stupidity. Good thing or bad thing?
Most likely a bad thing, given similar past examples. E.g. I’ve talked to atheists who won’t touch Bostrom/Anthropic Bias because they associate “the anthropic principle” with theological fine-tuning arguments. And the general problem of audiences’ first impression of Bayes being that it’s just another clever way to argue for whatever you want to believe or want others to believe.
On the other hand, it would be interesting to have more debates between theists and atheists who are both familiar with Bayes and use it explicitly, if the atheist is good enough at noticing and explaining flawed uses of it, so audiences can become familiar with fallacious uses of it and see that it can be used wisely.
Here’s some non-LW links: Richard Swinburne, Stephen Unwin.