Hey TAG, thanks for your reply and your great points.
If you could show that Mary never experiences a colour quale, whether as the result of a direct experience, or a real memory, or an implanted memory, you refute the argument.
Well, I don’t believe I’m trying to say that the color quale doesn’t exist—rather that the quale is the subject’s beliefs around that experience or memory, and that those beliefs are entirely physical constructs that exist within a physical brain.
What’s the problem? If Mary has a present experience of a blade of grass, she will have a novel colour quale, and she also will if she experiences a sufficiently vivid recollection… and that still applies if the memory was an implant.
This is based on an admittedly wild assumption that experiences memories that you know to not be yours would alter the quality of those experiences. The impact I think is lost when we deal with something as ubiquitious to the human experience as color. But Jackson seems to be making a general claim about all experiential qualia with this thought experiment, not a specific claim about color qualia, even if that is the example he chooses.
Maybe another example is implanting a memory of climbing Mount Everest—euphoric king-of-the-world moment included when you reach the peak. The belief around the veracity of that memory would alter your relationship to it, and you would gain some new qualia experience if you actually went and did it.
the quale is the subject’s beliefs around that experience or memory, and that those beliefs are entirely physical constructs that exist within a physical brain
If you could show that qualia are just beliefs , that would refute Jackson. But it is not clear that you are a sceptic about the very existence of qualia, since you keep using the term “qualia”.
...would alter the quality of those experiences.
Why does that matter? If there are any experiences or qualia, even changeable ones, Jackson has made his point.
Are you arguing that
Qualia (phenomenal states) do not exist unless they are distinct from cognitive states (beliefs, etc).
Distinct means completely distinct.
If so-called qualia can be influenced by beliefs , they are not completely distinct.
If there are any experiences or qualia, even changeable ones, Jackson has made his point.
Has he? As I understand it, Jackson is arguing specifically for a non-physicalist interpretation of qualia in his work, not just for the existance of qualia. He is arguing that you can have perfect information about an experience, yet actually experiencing that thing will still bring some new aspect to the experience, and whatever that aspect is is the qualia. The issue is with the nature of what the qualia of an experience is, and whether there is a physical manifestation of it, not whether it is a thing. It obviously is, as we constantly experience it. So, no, sorry if I have come across as arguing that qualia do not exist, that is not the position I’m trying to discuss here.
Sorry TAG I’m not quite sure I follow, but I do appreciate your feedback. This post is a refutation of Jackson’s view, so I’m not surprised that it is focusing on a negative. Whether something would alter the quality of those experiences is the crux of Jackson’s whole thought experiment—asking what changes between a mind with perfect information about an experience, and a mind who has genuinely had that experience. So, that question does seem at the heart of this thought experiment.
Perhaps a different way to think about Mary’s Room is the following:
You have two identical minds, A and B. You know that one mind has perfect information about an experience, and the other mind has genuinely experienced it. What questions can you ask each mind to determine which is which? Are you always able to determine an answer? Whatever pops out the end as the distinction between the perfect information and the subjective experience is, by definition, what the qualia of that experience was.
asking what changes between a mind with perfect information about an experience, and a mind who has genuinely had that experience.
Asking or answering? Do you have an answer to the question?
What questions can you ask each mind to determine which is which? Are you always able to determine an answer?
Maybe not. Why does that matter?. Qualia are supposed to be subjectve, so it’s not some gotcha to point out that they can’t be determined objectively.
Whatever pops out the end as the distinction between the perfect information and the subjective experience is, by definition, what the qualia of that experience was.
Maybe that is subjectivity itself. Maybe qualia are how observers perceive their own brain states.
I apologise TAG, I can’t say I’m trying to “gotcha” anything intentionally, just to discuss an interesting thought experiment.
I don’t know what the test is that you could perform, though I tried to present one possibility—your beliefs around that memory.
It matters here because I am specifically addressing Jackson’s views on Physicalism as presented in the original thought experiment, not all general views of qualia. The core of the question is if that is because of some physical phenomena.
Maybe that is subjectivity itself. Maybe qualia are how observes perceive their own brain states.
Yes, that is a good summary of what I am proposing here.
Gotchas aren’t an entirely bad thing, because at least you would be making a discernable point.
Well, I apologize that this has not been clear for you. I am somewhat surprised that you can so elegantly summarize my position while simultaneously saying I haven’t made that position, but maybe I’m just a lot, lot worse at expressing myself than I think I am haha.
I asked you directly whether you were asking or answering …and you did not answer!
Sorry, I’m not sure what this is regarding exactly. As in, am I asking Mary questions? Yes. Or am I asking a question about the thought experiment? Also yes. Or if the thought experiment is designed to provide a question as to what qualia is, or an answer? You tell me! I think it reveals something about what qualia is, at least, as the distinction between information about a thing and subjective experience of a thing.
Well, I think that is technically a departure from physicalism. But you said you are a physicalist!
Why is a belief a non-physical thing? It’s just a state within a system, arrangement of neurons, etc. The fact that it is a belief, and therefore something that has physical and real presence, is my whole refutation of Jackson’s view that it is something immeasurable or materially unknowable.
Maybe that is subjectivity itself. Maybe qualia are how observes perceive their own brain states.
You then said that this summary was a departure from physicalism. Could you explain what you meant by that? It was that statement that made me think you were saying that a belief was non-physical, as you said qualia being a belief was a departure from physicalism.
If you are saying that qualia are just beliefs that is a different claim, and one that you havent supported.
Oh dear… I think we might be in a bit of trouble, as I’m under the impression that’s pretty much the claim we’ve been talking about this whole time. It seems like another rephrasing of your previous summary, and exactly what I’ve been trying to say. The testable differences are the beliefs about that memory, and beliefs are a physical thing, so qualia don’t need to be supernatural or immeasureable.
You then said that this summary was a departure from physicalism. Could you explain what you meant by that?
I said is that is is “technically a departure from physicalism”.
I’m not talking in the usual vague terms of “physical stuff” and “mental stuff”.
If physicalism is taken as the claim that everything has, or potentially has, a reductive physical explanation, it follows that everything has a mathematical description, since mathematics is the language of physics. Physics doesn’t merely use numbers to represent measurements, it uses a variety of mathematical functions and structures to represent physical entities and laws. Mathematical language is the language of physics, and also the quintessential 3rd person, objective language, so physicalism, which is apparently an ontological claim, has an epistemological implication: physicalism implies reductionism implies physics implies maths implies objectivity.
Conversely, the claim that there is irreducible subjectivity is a departure from physicalism, but not in a way that means are mental entities, substances or even properties separate from physical ones. The minimal requirement to support the claim of irreducible subjectivity is that a conscious entity’s insight into its own mental states has ineffable, incommunicable aspects.
The testable differences are the beliefs about that memory, and beliefs are a physical thing, so qualia don’t need to be supernatural or immeasureable.
That summary argument isn’t valid. In order to get from the premise (1) that the only knowable differences between qualia are stateable beliefs about qualia, to the conclusion that (3) qualia actually are mere beliefs , you need (2) the assumption that qualia cannot differ in ways known only to the person who has them...which begs the question against anything being inherently subjective or incommunicable.
That’s a great point! There is that possibility, but do we need to make that assumption? I’m not sure.
Mary would be able to tell us if “qualia did not differ in ways known only to the person who had them”, even if she might not be able to describe to us exactly how. She’d be able to say “that was different”, even if the precise words to describe how it was different escaped her, and that true/false response is enough to draw some meaningful conclusion about the existance of something, even if it doesn’t tell you anything about the nature of that thing. And if it’s completely imperceptable to Mary, then it can’t be qualia, as qualia is by definition about subjective perception.
Hey TAG, thanks for your reply and your great points.
Well, I don’t believe I’m trying to say that the color quale doesn’t exist—rather that the quale is the subject’s beliefs around that experience or memory, and that those beliefs are entirely physical constructs that exist within a physical brain.
This is based on an admittedly wild assumption that experiences memories that you know to not be yours would alter the quality of those experiences. The impact I think is lost when we deal with something as ubiquitious to the human experience as color. But Jackson seems to be making a general claim about all experiential qualia with this thought experiment, not a specific claim about color qualia, even if that is the example he chooses.
Maybe another example is implanting a memory of climbing Mount Everest—euphoric king-of-the-world moment included when you reach the peak. The belief around the veracity of that memory would alter your relationship to it, and you would gain some new qualia experience if you actually went and did it.
If you could show that qualia are just beliefs , that would refute Jackson. But it is not clear that you are a sceptic about the very existence of qualia, since you keep using the term “qualia”.
Why does that matter? If there are any experiences or qualia, even changeable ones, Jackson has made his point.
Are you arguing that
Qualia (phenomenal states) do not exist unless they are distinct from cognitive states (beliefs, etc).
Distinct means completely distinct.
If so-called qualia can be influenced by beliefs , they are not completely distinct.
They can be influenced by beliefs
So they dont exist.
Has he? As I understand it, Jackson is arguing specifically for a non-physicalist interpretation of qualia in his work, not just for the existance of qualia. He is arguing that you can have perfect information about an experience, yet actually experiencing that thing will still bring some new aspect to the experience, and whatever that aspect is is the qualia. The issue is with the nature of what the qualia of an experience is, and whether there is a physical manifestation of it, not whether it is a thing. It obviously is, as we constantly experience it. So, no, sorry if I have come across as arguing that qualia do not exist, that is not the position I’m trying to discuss here.
You’ve told me what you don’t think, not what you do. Why does it matter that something “would alter the quality of those experiences”?
Sorry TAG I’m not quite sure I follow, but I do appreciate your feedback. This post is a refutation of Jackson’s view, so I’m not surprised that it is focusing on a negative. Whether something would alter the quality of those experiences is the crux of Jackson’s whole thought experiment—asking what changes between a mind with perfect information about an experience, and a mind who has genuinely had that experience. So, that question does seem at the heart of this thought experiment.
Perhaps a different way to think about Mary’s Room is the following:
You have two identical minds, A and B. You know that one mind has perfect information about an experience, and the other mind has genuinely experienced it. What questions can you ask each mind to determine which is which? Are you always able to determine an answer? Whatever pops out the end as the distinction between the perfect information and the subjective experience is, by definition, what the qualia of that experience was.
Asking or answering? Do you have an answer to the question?
Maybe not. Why does that matter?. Qualia are supposed to be subjectve, so it’s not some gotcha to point out that they can’t be determined objectively.
Maybe that is subjectivity itself. Maybe qualia are how observers perceive their own brain states.
I apologise TAG, I can’t say I’m trying to “gotcha” anything intentionally, just to discuss an interesting thought experiment.
I don’t know what the test is that you could perform, though I tried to present one possibility—your beliefs around that memory.
It matters here because I am specifically addressing Jackson’s views on Physicalism as presented in the original thought experiment, not all general views of qualia. The core of the question is if that is because of some physical phenomena.
Yes, that is a good summary of what I am proposing here.
Gotchas aren’t an entirely bad thing, because at least you would be making a discernable point.
I asked you directly whether you were asking or answering …and you did not answer!
Well, I think that is technically a departure from physicalism. But you said you are a physicalist!
Well, I apologize that this has not been clear for you. I am somewhat surprised that you can so elegantly summarize my position while simultaneously saying I haven’t made that position, but maybe I’m just a lot, lot worse at expressing myself than I think I am haha.
Sorry, I’m not sure what this is regarding exactly. As in, am I asking Mary questions? Yes. Or am I asking a question about the thought experiment? Also yes. Or if the thought experiment is designed to provide a question as to what qualia is, or an answer? You tell me! I think it reveals something about what qualia is, at least, as the distinction between information about a thing and subjective experience of a thing.
Why is a belief a non-physical thing? It’s just a state within a system, arrangement of neurons, etc. The fact that it is a belief, and therefore something that has physical and real presence, is my whole refutation of Jackson’s view that it is something immeasurable or materially unknowable.
You didn’t state that position in your OP. It took a whole series of guesses to get to this point.
I didn’t say anything of the kind.
If you are saying that qualia are just beliefs that is a different claim, and one that you havent supported.
Why should some, but only some beliefs, be inherently subjective?
May I clarify, when you said:
You then said that this summary was a departure from physicalism. Could you explain what you meant by that? It was that statement that made me think you were saying that a belief was non-physical, as you said qualia being a belief was a departure from physicalism.
Oh dear… I think we might be in a bit of trouble, as I’m under the impression that’s pretty much the claim we’ve been talking about this whole time. It seems like another rephrasing of your previous summary, and exactly what I’ve been trying to say. The testable differences are the beliefs about that memory, and beliefs are a physical thing, so qualia don’t need to be supernatural or immeasureable.
I said is that is is “technically a departure from physicalism”.
I’m not talking in the usual vague terms of “physical stuff” and “mental stuff”.
If physicalism is taken as the claim that everything has, or potentially has, a reductive physical explanation, it follows that everything has a mathematical description, since mathematics is the language of physics. Physics doesn’t merely use numbers to represent measurements, it uses a variety of mathematical functions and structures to represent physical entities and laws. Mathematical language is the language of physics, and also the quintessential 3rd person, objective language, so physicalism, which is apparently an ontological claim, has an epistemological implication: physicalism implies reductionism implies physics implies maths implies objectivity.
Conversely, the claim that there is irreducible subjectivity is a departure from physicalism, but not in a way that means are mental entities, substances or even properties separate from physical ones. The minimal requirement to support the claim of irreducible subjectivity is that a conscious entity’s insight into its own mental states has ineffable, incommunicable aspects.
That summary argument isn’t valid. In order to get from the premise (1) that the only knowable differences between qualia are stateable beliefs about qualia, to the conclusion that (3) qualia actually are mere beliefs , you need (2) the assumption that qualia cannot differ in ways known only to the person who has them...which begs the question against anything being inherently subjective or incommunicable.
That’s a great point! There is that possibility, but do we need to make that assumption? I’m not sure.
Mary would be able to tell us if “qualia did not differ in ways known only to the person who had them”, even if she might not be able to describe to us exactly how. She’d be able to say “that was different”, even if the precise words to describe how it was different escaped her, and that true/false response is enough to draw some meaningful conclusion about the existance of something, even if it doesn’t tell you anything about the nature of that thing. And if it’s completely imperceptable to Mary, then it can’t be qualia, as qualia is by definition about subjective perception.