I mean it was a point that I made from just playing around with the thought experiment. I don’t know if it is the point, that’s why I’m trying to dissect it a little here.
What I’m not understanding is your argument for getting there. Either it’s not valid, or I don’t understand what you mean.
I would be happy to keep trying to explain. Let me try to lay it out again in a different way, and I’d be interested to hear what you think:
Mary has perfect knowledge—that is, all knowable information she possibly can—about an experience
At the start of the experiment, Mary knows with certainty that they have not actually had that experience
Mary goes through a door, and I randomly flip two coins—one to determine if we implant the memory or actually give Mary the experience, and one to determine if we inform Mary of the first coin flip. I don’t tell you about the outcomes of either flip.
Mary comes back through the door, and your task is to interrogate Mary to find out the coin flips.
What questions can you ask Mary to determine these answers? When can you be confident, and when is the answer indeterminable?
A second way to think about it is if you sent Mary through the door a 2nd time, in which scenarios would Mary learn something new—and therefore experience the qualia they did not posess at the start of the experiment, despite their perfect information?
Mary has perfect knowledge—that is, all knowable information she possibly can—about an experience
I dispute this premise. If Mary knows how to visualize something red (and learned how to do so through some means other than seeing it with her eyes) and knows that it’s called “red”, then that’s knowledge, and she won’t learn anything new by seeing it for the first time. This isn’t knowledge that Mary could acquire by reading black-and-white textbooks about cone cells and neurons, but hypothetically the knowledge could be implanted in her brain via some technology while bypassing her eyes.
Mary aquires the new, novel experience of believing that she has seen the color red, when she previously held the belief that she only had perfect, but non-subjective knowledge. Qualia does not necessarily need to be new information as this attempts to demonstrate, it just is whatever is different about your mind when you actually experience a thing.
I mean it was a point that I made from just playing around with the thought experiment. I don’t know if it is the point, that’s why I’m trying to dissect it a little here.
I would be happy to keep trying to explain. Let me try to lay it out again in a different way, and I’d be interested to hear what you think:
Mary has perfect knowledge—that is, all knowable information she possibly can—about an experience
At the start of the experiment, Mary knows with certainty that they have not actually had that experience
Mary goes through a door, and I randomly flip two coins—one to determine if we implant the memory or actually give Mary the experience, and one to determine if we inform Mary of the first coin flip. I don’t tell you about the outcomes of either flip.
Mary comes back through the door, and your task is to interrogate Mary to find out the coin flips.
What questions can you ask Mary to determine these answers? When can you be confident, and when is the answer indeterminable?
A second way to think about it is if you sent Mary through the door a 2nd time, in which scenarios would Mary learn something new—and therefore experience the qualia they did not posess at the start of the experiment, despite their perfect information?
I dispute this premise. If Mary knows how to visualize something red (and learned how to do so through some means other than seeing it with her eyes) and knows that it’s called “red”, then that’s knowledge, and she won’t learn anything new by seeing it for the first time. This isn’t knowledge that Mary could acquire by reading black-and-white textbooks about cone cells and neurons, but hypothetically the knowledge could be implanted in her brain via some technology while bypassing her eyes.
Mary aquires the new, novel experience of believing that she has seen the color red, when she previously held the belief that she only had perfect, but non-subjective knowledge. Qualia does not necessarily need to be new information as this attempts to demonstrate, it just is whatever is different about your mind when you actually experience a thing.