In the mutant game where you always think that your opponent’s last move was the same as your last move, I think EarlyBirdMimicBot behaves as follows in the first 10 rounds:
Against clones, gets full clone cooperation of either all 3-2 or all 2-3. I put in a check to stop cooperating with clone if the clone ever starts exploiting me, but the check doesn’t notice that turns so far seem to have been all 2-2 or all 3-3.
Against simulatable bots, gets one turn of simulation, then next turn sees that the opponent’s apparent move was not the same as what was predicted. Reverts to the fallback plan.
Against everything else, thinks that every turn so far has been a match, so continues its early match-breaking strategy of playing 2 with probability 2⁄3 and 3 with probability 1⁄3. I think that’s close to a Nash equilibrium in the blind game.
Against outsiders, Clonebot will always play 3 if it played 2 last turn, and in an apparent 3-3 match it transitions between 50% chance to play 2 initially and 0% by turn 50.
In the mutant game where you always think that your opponent’s last move was the same as your last move, I think EarlyBirdMimicBot behaves as follows in the first 10 rounds:
Against clones, gets full clone cooperation of either all 3-2 or all 2-3. I put in a check to stop cooperating with clone if the clone ever starts exploiting me, but the check doesn’t notice that turns so far seem to have been all 2-2 or all 3-3.
Against simulatable bots, gets one turn of simulation, then next turn sees that the opponent’s apparent move was not the same as what was predicted. Reverts to the fallback plan.
Against everything else, thinks that every turn so far has been a match, so continues its early match-breaking strategy of playing 2 with probability 2⁄3 and 3 with probability 1⁄3. I think that’s close to a Nash equilibrium in the blind game.
Against outsiders, Clonebot will always play 3 if it played 2 last turn, and in an apparent 3-3 match it transitions between 50% chance to play 2 initially and 0% by turn 50.