Thank you for your comment about “structured patterns”. I think you did a great job of explaining ideas I had not delved deep into within my original post. I like your metaphor about how mystics map “more of the territory” too. I think some schools (vipassana especially) map the territory in finer detail as well.
I feel like Eliezer Yudkowsky’s argument about Bayesian complexity in his Quantum Physics and Many Worlds sequence favors the mystics’ perspective. Why do you think Occam’s Razor favors the second perspective? Are “weird neurological pathways” not part of the territory of consciousness?
Why do you think Occam’s Razor favors the second perspective?
Because assuming there’s a larger territory means, within a reductionist perspective such as the one favored by LWers, assuming a larger set of first principles, while assuming it’s an incorrect perception retains the same set of first principles. Hence, Occam’s Razor favors the second alternative. But only as long as there’s no further evidence for the first, at which point the likelihood for both hypothesis would slide accordingly.
Thank you for your comment about “structured patterns”. I think you did a great job of explaining ideas I had not delved deep into within my original post. I like your metaphor about how mystics map “more of the territory” too. I think some schools (vipassana especially) map the territory in finer detail as well.
I feel like Eliezer Yudkowsky’s argument about Bayesian complexity in his Quantum Physics and Many Worlds sequence favors the mystics’ perspective. Why do you think Occam’s Razor favors the second perspective? Are “weird neurological pathways” not part of the territory of consciousness?
Because assuming there’s a larger territory means, within a reductionist perspective such as the one favored by LWers, assuming a larger set of first principles, while assuming it’s an incorrect perception retains the same set of first principles. Hence, Occam’s Razor favors the second alternative. But only as long as there’s no further evidence for the first, at which point the likelihood for both hypothesis would slide accordingly.