Would you consider the actions of Stanislav Petrov an example of flinching away? It seems like there might be historical examples of where flinching has overwhelmingly beneficial consequences, if I understand flinching away right.
No, because he was updating on the evidence. If the satellites had detected a full launch of thousands of US missiles and Petrov had delayed launching, that would have been flinching away.
Petrov later indicated the influences in this decision included: that he was informed a U.S. strike would be all-out, so five missiles seemed an illogical start,[1] that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy, and that ground radars failed to pick up corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay.
Apparently there was a bit of reasoning that went into ignoring what seemed to be a strike, so it wasn’t flinching away dramatically. I suppose the point is that while flinching away is bad, you also can be overly impulsive, and history gives us examples of both. This, of course, does not say we should not continue to advocate against flinching away.
Also note that if US strike were a real five-missile strike, the retaliation would still be possible. Even half of the USSR stockpile was enough to level all the major military bases and industrial cities. If USSR “retaliated” to something that was not a real first strike… Let’s just say that Petrov chose the cheaper risk.
Would you consider the actions of Stanislav Petrov an example of flinching away? It seems like there might be historical examples of where flinching has overwhelmingly beneficial consequences, if I understand flinching away right.
No, because he was updating on the evidence. If the satellites had detected a full launch of thousands of US missiles and Petrov had delayed launching, that would have been flinching away.
Wikipedia says:
Apparently there was a bit of reasoning that went into ignoring what seemed to be a strike, so it wasn’t flinching away dramatically. I suppose the point is that while flinching away is bad, you also can be overly impulsive, and history gives us examples of both. This, of course, does not say we should not continue to advocate against flinching away.
Also note that if US strike were a real five-missile strike, the retaliation would still be possible. Even half of the USSR stockpile was enough to level all the major military bases and industrial cities. If USSR “retaliated” to something that was not a real first strike… Let’s just say that Petrov chose the cheaper risk.
There’s a natural cluster of “flinching away from the evidence because it makes you uncomfortable”, and that cluster does not include what Petrov did.