One example, maybe: I think the early 20th century behaviorists mistakenly (to my mind) discarded the idea that e.g. mice are usefully modeled as having something like (beliefs, memories, desires, internal states), because they lumped this in with something like “woo.” (They applied this also to humans, at least sometimes.)
The article Cognition all the way down argues that a similar transition may be useful in biology, where e.g. embryogenesis may be more rapidly modeled if biologists become willing to discuss the “intent” of a given cellular signal or similar. I found it worth reading. (HT: Adam Scholl, for showing me the article.)
One example, maybe: I think the early 20th century behaviorists mistakenly (to my mind) discarded the idea that e.g. mice are usefully modeled as having something like (beliefs, memories, desires, internal states), because they lumped this in with something like “woo.” (They applied this also to humans, at least sometimes.)
The article Cognition all the way down argues that a similar transition may be useful in biology, where e.g. embryogenesis may be more rapidly modeled if biologists become willing to discuss the “intent” of a given cellular signal or similar. I found it worth reading. (HT: Adam Scholl, for showing me the article.)