Your factual claims here seem at least somewhat reasonable. Naively extrapolating sub-replacement fertility centuries into the future is silly. Our wealthy civilization ought to be capable of finding some way of coping with increased elder care. The current number of humans may perhaps be more than is optimal.
But your moral view is atrocious. Human extinction would be bad—very bad. Because humans are the most interesting species to arise so far. Because human striving is properly focused on the future, not just hedonistic pleasures of the moment. Because there may be a meaning to human existence that we can so far only dimly perceive.
And more humans are better, if they come at no (or small) cost to the quality of life of the existing humans. Human lives have intrinsic value, and every additional life adds value.
I do wonder if your moral views have biased your factual assessments as well.
Worrying about extinction is one thing, and we’re nowhere near that point, but does the pro fertility case rely on the philosophical assumption that more people is better? Surely you can see how some people might not find that very compelling.
I think that various “pro-fertility” people have a variety of motivations.
But “more people are better” ought to be a belief of everyone, whether pro-fertility or not. It’s an “other things being equal” statement, of course—more people at no cost or other tradeoff is good. One can believe that and still think that less people would be a good idea in the current situation. But if you don’t think more people are good when there’s no tradeoff, I don’t see what moral view you can have other than nihilism or some form of extreme egoism.
BTW: I’m not ruling out an expansive definition of “people”—maybe gorillas are people, maybe some alien species are, maybe some AIs would be—but I think that’s outside the scope of the current discussion.
But “more people are better” ought to be a belief of everyone, whether pro-fertility or not. It’s an “other things being equal” statement, of course—more people at no cost or other tradeoff is good. One can believe that and still think that less people would be a good idea in the current situation. But if you don’t think more people are good when there’s no tradeoff, I don’t see what moral view you can have other than nihilism or some form of extreme egoism.
Do all variants of downside focused ethics get dismissed as extreme egoism? Hard to see them as nihilistic.
I suspect clarity and consensus on the meaning of “more people at no cost or other tradeoff” to be difficult. If “more people” means more happy people preoccupied with the welfare of the least fortunate, then sure “at no cost or other tradeoff” should suffice for practically everyone to get behind it. But that seems like quite a biased distribution for a default meaning of “more people.”
Your factual claims here seem at least somewhat reasonable. Naively extrapolating sub-replacement fertility centuries into the future is silly. Our wealthy civilization ought to be capable of finding some way of coping with increased elder care. The current number of humans may perhaps be more than is optimal.
But your moral view is atrocious. Human extinction would be bad—very bad. Because humans are the most interesting species to arise so far. Because human striving is properly focused on the future, not just hedonistic pleasures of the moment. Because there may be a meaning to human existence that we can so far only dimly perceive.
And more humans are better, if they come at no (or small) cost to the quality of life of the existing humans. Human lives have intrinsic value, and every additional life adds value.
I do wonder if your moral views have biased your factual assessments as well.
Worrying about extinction is one thing, and we’re nowhere near that point, but does the pro fertility case rely on the philosophical assumption that more people is better? Surely you can see how some people might not find that very compelling.
I think that various “pro-fertility” people have a variety of motivations.
But “more people are better” ought to be a belief of everyone, whether pro-fertility or not. It’s an “other things being equal” statement, of course—more people at no cost or other tradeoff is good. One can believe that and still think that less people would be a good idea in the current situation. But if you don’t think more people are good when there’s no tradeoff, I don’t see what moral view you can have other than nihilism or some form of extreme egoism.
BTW: I’m not ruling out an expansive definition of “people”—maybe gorillas are people, maybe some alien species are, maybe some AIs would be—but I think that’s outside the scope of the current discussion.
Do all variants of downside focused ethics get dismissed as extreme egoism? Hard to see them as nihilistic.
I suspect clarity and consensus on the meaning of “more people at no cost or other tradeoff” to be difficult. If “more people” means more happy people preoccupied with the welfare of the least fortunate, then sure “at no cost or other tradeoff” should suffice for practically everyone to get behind it. But that seems like quite a biased distribution for a default meaning of “more people.”