Yes, consequentialism judges the act of visiting a friend in hospital to be (almost certainly) good since the outcome is (almost certainly) better than not doing it. That’s it. No other considerations need apply. What their motivation was and whether there exist other possible acts that were also good are irrelevant.
If someone visits their sick friend only because it is a moral duty to do so, then I would have doubts that they are actually a friend. If there is any ugliness, it’s just the implied wider implications of deceiving their “friend” about actually being a friend. Even then, consequentialism in itself does not imply any duty to perform any specific good act so it still doesn’t really fit. That sounds more like some strict form of utilitarianism, except that a strict utilitarian probably won’t be visiting a sick friend since there is so much more marginal utility in addressing much more serious unmet needs of larger numbers of people.
If they visit their sick friend because they personally care about their friend’s welfare, and their moral framework also judges it a good act to visit them, then where’s the ugliness?
… consequentialism judges the act of visiting a friend in hospital to be (almost certainly) good since the outcome is (almost certainly) better than not doing it. That’s it. No other considerations need apply. [...] whether there exist other possible acts that were also good are irrelevant.
I don’t know of any consequentialist theory that looks like that. What is the general consequentialist principle you are deploying here? Your reasoning seems very one off. Which is fine! That’s exactly what I’m advocating for! But I think we’re talking past each other then. I’m criticizing Consequentialismnot just any old moral reasoning that happens to reference the consequences of one’s actions (see my response to npostavs)
Yes, consequentialism judges the act of visiting a friend in hospital to be (almost certainly) good since the outcome is (almost certainly) better than not doing it. That’s it. No other considerations need apply. What their motivation was and whether there exist other possible acts that were also good are irrelevant.
If someone visits their sick friend only because it is a moral duty to do so, then I would have doubts that they are actually a friend. If there is any ugliness, it’s just the implied wider implications of deceiving their “friend” about actually being a friend. Even then, consequentialism in itself does not imply any duty to perform any specific good act so it still doesn’t really fit. That sounds more like some strict form of utilitarianism, except that a strict utilitarian probably won’t be visiting a sick friend since there is so much more marginal utility in addressing much more serious unmet needs of larger numbers of people.
If they visit their sick friend because they personally care about their friend’s welfare, and their moral framework also judges it a good act to visit them, then where’s the ugliness?
I don’t know of any consequentialist theory that looks like that. What is the general consequentialist principle you are deploying here? Your reasoning seems very one off. Which is fine! That’s exactly what I’m advocating for! But I think we’re talking past each other then. I’m criticizing Consequentialism not just any old moral reasoning that happens to reference the consequences of one’s actions (see my response to npostavs)