It seems to me that people here are very aware of the very real ways in which they are in fact very superior to the general public, even the elite public, and also of the very real ways in which they are, in most cases, very inferior to the elite public (and frequently somewhat inferior to the general public). The problem is that they tend to morally endorse both their strengths AND their weaknesses, seeing, as Robin does, both as ‘high’. I see the high/low motivation intuition as actually being somewhat rarer in the general world that Robin and most people here see it, and think that it is actually a much more common distinction in this culture than in most cultures. Partly people are simply choosing a measuring standard which makes them look impressive but partly they are unimpressive BECAUSE they have chosen, without fully understanding what they are doing or what the consequences are, to shape themselves in order to be impressive by a different standard than most people choose.
The best example I can think of for people valuing their flaws as well as their strong points would be smart people who think their lack of general social skills is proof of superiority. Or (though not a problem here) people who think street smarts mean that it’s best not to have intellectual skills.
People don’t delude themselves about their own traits, they delude themselves about what traits a human without specific information about his or her self sees as good, choosing to see many of their own traits as good rather than as bad and failing to notice that people who lack those traits consistently see things otherwise. For instance, many people who are good at thinking productively about painful facts treat traits like an insufficient reluctance to harm those who are not so gifted as a virtue, even creating slogan to that effect such as “that which can be destroyed by the truth should be”. Others rightly see this as a justification for claiming moral superiority while harming those unlike themselves, largely do to status motives.
I’d have thought that the biggest risk from being attached to “That which can be destroyed by the truth should be” is being too ready to believe statements which can cause destruction.
If I may summarize: you’re saying that we tend to assume certain traits, like attachment to seeking the truth even at high cost, are self-evidently morally praiseworthy—an assumption not shared by the rest of society, which values other things more highly. Moreover, this assumption of ours comes ultimately from an impulse to status-seeking. Does that do it justice?
Assuming I do understand you, first, I would say that explaining a belief of this community as purely a result of status-seeking considerations is a Fully General Counterargument against any & all beliefs of any groups… you will be able to find status motives for almost all human actions, but this does not mean status is the primary cause or even is a cause at all, rather than an effect. One is reminded of how psychological egoists define altruism out of existence by finding some supposedly selfish positive motive in the altruist, like satisfaction at having helped.
I think there is a moral fact of the matter in whether the ability to face hard facts & force others to do so (within reason) is good or bad. You can prove to me that my endorsement of the ability is motivated by status, but I’ll still want to know how to actually act.
Well, first off it’s an impulse grounded in the desire to feel high status (feeling this is reinforcing), not an adaptive impulse to seek status. Second The impulse that outsiders would find not to be a virtue is less the courage of facing the truth than the callousness of inflicting it on others who lack that courage against their preferences and potentially against their interests as well.
When groups differ in values in a predictable manner, each choosing values that confer greater status upon itself, this is not a fully general counterargument. Nietzsche and others who display intellectual virtue in arguing for the primacy of physical and emotional virtues, for instance, can’t sensibly be accused of this. He may be seeking status with the quality of his rhetoric but not through any self-aggrandizing conclusions he reaches.
I think that there is a fact of the matter too, and that fact is that the ability to face hard facts without suffering is good even when taken to unreasonable extremes, and is in fact much better than non-Buddhists appreciate. The inclination to cause others to hold accurate beliefs is also overwhelmingly good, though not to such a shockingly extreme degree. The quote however is “that which can...” not “that which must...”. The impulse to use truth to destroy whatever can be destroyed with truth is a malevolent one, and this is obvious to anyone who doesn’t anticipate higher status in a world where the ability to face truth has its value increased.
I think I see your point… though the “What can be destroyed by the truth, should be” quote, I always took to be limited to the world of ideas; i.e., any idea that can be… should be.
But as has been remarked before, the more you load an aphorism down with caveats, the worse an aphorism it becomes. Or as Shakespeare famously said: “Brevity—in speech and conduct, but not in any other senses of the word—is the soul, understood metaphorically & non-dualistically of course, of wit.”
So while I see your concern in principle, I’m not too worried. I really doubt that LWers actually take this quote to mean you have a moral duty to, for example, visit old widowers and widows and berate them for the stupidity of talking to their dead lovers. Or find out and reveal the USA’s nuclear launch codes. Or forcibly “out” every young LGBT person they know.
Actually, those do seem like the sort of things that LWers would be much more inclined to do than would the general population. The odds would still be low in such spectacularly obvious cases, but much less low than they should be.
an insufficient reluctance to harm those who are not so gifted as a virtue, even creating slogan to that effect such as “that which can be destroyed by the truth should be”.
This seems to be contradictory to me. The first part says that says that people like us hold it to be virtuous not to introduce the truth to those who can’t deal with it, and the second suggests that we do so. What am I missing?
Illusory superiority seems to be the cognitive bias to overcome here.
It seems to me that people here are very aware of the very real ways in which they are in fact very superior to the general public, even the elite public, and also of the very real ways in which they are, in most cases, very inferior to the elite public (and frequently somewhat inferior to the general public). The problem is that they tend to morally endorse both their strengths AND their weaknesses, seeing, as Robin does, both as ‘high’. I see the high/low motivation intuition as actually being somewhat rarer in the general world that Robin and most people here see it, and think that it is actually a much more common distinction in this culture than in most cultures. Partly people are simply choosing a measuring standard which makes them look impressive but partly they are unimpressive BECAUSE they have chosen, without fully understanding what they are doing or what the consequences are, to shape themselves in order to be impressive by a different standard than most people choose.
The best example I can think of for people valuing their flaws as well as their strong points would be smart people who think their lack of general social skills is proof of superiority. Or (though not a problem here) people who think street smarts mean that it’s best not to have intellectual skills.
How do you mean?
People don’t delude themselves about their own traits, they delude themselves about what traits a human without specific information about his or her self sees as good, choosing to see many of their own traits as good rather than as bad and failing to notice that people who lack those traits consistently see things otherwise. For instance, many people who are good at thinking productively about painful facts treat traits like an insufficient reluctance to harm those who are not so gifted as a virtue, even creating slogan to that effect such as “that which can be destroyed by the truth should be”. Others rightly see this as a justification for claiming moral superiority while harming those unlike themselves, largely do to status motives.
I’d have thought that the biggest risk from being attached to “That which can be destroyed by the truth should be” is being too ready to believe statements which can cause destruction.
If I may summarize: you’re saying that we tend to assume certain traits, like attachment to seeking the truth even at high cost, are self-evidently morally praiseworthy—an assumption not shared by the rest of society, which values other things more highly. Moreover, this assumption of ours comes ultimately from an impulse to status-seeking. Does that do it justice?
Assuming I do understand you, first, I would say that explaining a belief of this community as purely a result of status-seeking considerations is a Fully General Counterargument against any & all beliefs of any groups… you will be able to find status motives for almost all human actions, but this does not mean status is the primary cause or even is a cause at all, rather than an effect. One is reminded of how psychological egoists define altruism out of existence by finding some supposedly selfish positive motive in the altruist, like satisfaction at having helped.
I think there is a moral fact of the matter in whether the ability to face hard facts & force others to do so (within reason) is good or bad. You can prove to me that my endorsement of the ability is motivated by status, but I’ll still want to know how to actually act.
Well, first off it’s an impulse grounded in the desire to feel high status (feeling this is reinforcing), not an adaptive impulse to seek status. Second The impulse that outsiders would find not to be a virtue is less the courage of facing the truth than the callousness of inflicting it on others who lack that courage against their preferences and potentially against their interests as well.
When groups differ in values in a predictable manner, each choosing values that confer greater status upon itself, this is not a fully general counterargument. Nietzsche and others who display intellectual virtue in arguing for the primacy of physical and emotional virtues, for instance, can’t sensibly be accused of this. He may be seeking status with the quality of his rhetoric but not through any self-aggrandizing conclusions he reaches.
I think that there is a fact of the matter too, and that fact is that the ability to face hard facts without suffering is good even when taken to unreasonable extremes, and is in fact much better than non-Buddhists appreciate. The inclination to cause others to hold accurate beliefs is also overwhelmingly good, though not to such a shockingly extreme degree. The quote however is “that which can...” not “that which must...”. The impulse to use truth to destroy whatever can be destroyed with truth is a malevolent one, and this is obvious to anyone who doesn’t anticipate higher status in a world where the ability to face truth has its value increased.
I think I see your point… though the “What can be destroyed by the truth, should be” quote, I always took to be limited to the world of ideas; i.e., any idea that can be… should be.
But as has been remarked before, the more you load an aphorism down with caveats, the worse an aphorism it becomes. Or as Shakespeare famously said: “Brevity—in speech and conduct, but not in any other senses of the word—is the soul, understood metaphorically & non-dualistically of course, of wit.”
So while I see your concern in principle, I’m not too worried. I really doubt that LWers actually take this quote to mean you have a moral duty to, for example, visit old widowers and widows and berate them for the stupidity of talking to their dead lovers. Or find out and reveal the USA’s nuclear launch codes. Or forcibly “out” every young LGBT person they know.
Actually, those do seem like the sort of things that LWers would be much more inclined to do than would the general population. The odds would still be low in such spectacularly obvious cases, but much less low than they should be.
This seems to be contradictory to me. The first part says that says that people like us hold it to be virtuous not to introduce the truth to those who can’t deal with it, and the second suggests that we do so. What am I missing?
No, the first part says the opposite of what you think it says.