Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it does not replace it or aim at replacing it.
Since Popper refuted traditional epistemology (source: his books, and the failure of anyone to come up with any good criticisms of his main ideas), and Bayesian Epistemology retains it, then Bayesian Epistemology is refuted too. And discussing this issue can be done without mentioning probability, Bayes’ theorem, or Solomonoff induction. Bringing those up cannot be a relevant defense since traditional epistemology, which doesn’t use them, is retained.
Bayesian epistemology is, in the first place, a philosophical project, and that it is its ambition to further progress in philosophy.
Why are most Less Wrong people anti-philosophy then? There’s so much instrumentalism, empiricism, reductionism and borderline postivism. Not much interest in philosophy.
Section 2 introduces the probability calculus and explains why degrees of belief obey the probability calculus. Section 3 applies the formal machinery to an analysis of the notion of evidence, and high- lights potential application. Section 4 discusses Bayesian models of coherence and testimony, and section 5 ends this essay with a comparison of traditional epistemology and Bayesian epistemology.
Sections 2-4 are irrelevant. They are already assuming mistakes from traditional epistemology. Moving on to 5, which is only one page.
Bayesian epistemology, on the other hand, draws much of its power from the mathematical machinery of probability theory. It starts with a mathematical intuition.
Advocating intuitionism is very silly.
traditional epistemology inspires Bayesian accounts.
So Bayesians should care about criticisms of traditional epistemoloyg, and be willing to engage with them directly without even mentioning any Bayesian stuff.
Both Bayesian epistemology and traditional epistemology do not much consider empirical data. Both are based on intuitions,
That’s not even close to what most Less Wrong people told me. They mostly are very focussed on empirical data.
This might be a problem as privilege is given to the philosopher’s intuitions.
Might be? lol… What a hedge. They know it’s a problem and equivocate.
non-philosophers may have different intuitions.
Also Popperian philosophers, and all other types that don’t agree with you.
While it is debatable how serious these intuitions should be taken (maybe peo- ple are simply wrong!)
But not traditional philosophers, who have reliable intuitions? This is just plain silly.
It is therefore advisable that philosophers also keep on paying attention to other formal frameworks
But not informal frameworks, because your intuition says that formality is next to Godliness?
Do you think people other than you will like it? I think many will complain about the style and i didn’t want to rewrite it more formally. also i dismissed most of the paper as irrelevant. i expect people to complain about that and don’t particularly expect the discussion to go anywhere.
You’d probably have to change the style, yes. And no, I don’t expect other people to like it, but I expect that they will respond. Also: you’re probably going to have to either go into more depth or pick a specific example, or both.
Can you explain how we believe that Bayesianism leads to better decisonmaking? I’m not even asking you to do it, I no longer have high expectations of productivity from this conversation and don’t intend to prolong it, but know that if you can’t, you don’t understand what we offer at all.
Good criticisms here, yet downvoted to −3. Do LWer’s really want to be less wrong?
There’s a general pattern here. Some of this comments are potentially good. But the general pattern either a) misses points b) doesn’t actually grapple with what he is claiming it does and c) is uncivil. C is a major issue. Obnoxious remarks like “But not informal frameworks, because your intuition says that formality is next to Godliness?” are going to get downvoted.
People are inclined to downvote uncvil comments for a variety of reasons: 1) They reinforce emotionalism on all members of a discussion, making the actual exchange of ideas less likely. 2) They make the individual making the comments much less likely to acknowledge when they are wrong (this is due to standard cognitive biases). 3) They make communities less pleasant.
Uncivil comments that support common beliefs are also voted down. LWians are not perfect and you shouldn’t be surprised if that is going to occur even more with comments that are uncivil and go against the consensus. In this particular case, it also doesn’t help that most of the uncivility is at the end of the comment, so one moves directly from reading the unproductive, uncivil remarks to seeing the vote button.
It’s not at all canonical, but a paper that neatly summarizes Bayesian epistemology is “Bayesian Epistemology” by Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger.
Found it.
http://www.stephanhartmann.org/HartmannSprenger_BayesEpis.pdf
Will take a look in a bit.
Excellent, thanks.
http://www.stephanhartmann.org/HartmannSprenger_BayesEpis.pdf
Since Popper refuted traditional epistemology (source: his books, and the failure of anyone to come up with any good criticisms of his main ideas), and Bayesian Epistemology retains it, then Bayesian Epistemology is refuted too. And discussing this issue can be done without mentioning probability, Bayes’ theorem, or Solomonoff induction. Bringing those up cannot be a relevant defense since traditional epistemology, which doesn’t use them, is retained.
Why are most Less Wrong people anti-philosophy then? There’s so much instrumentalism, empiricism, reductionism and borderline postivism. Not much interest in philosophy.
Sections 2-4 are irrelevant. They are already assuming mistakes from traditional epistemology. Moving on to 5, which is only one page.
Advocating intuitionism is very silly.
So Bayesians should care about criticisms of traditional epistemoloyg, and be willing to engage with them directly without even mentioning any Bayesian stuff.
That’s not even close to what most Less Wrong people told me. They mostly are very focussed on empirical data.
Might be? lol… What a hedge. They know it’s a problem and equivocate.
Also Popperian philosophers, and all other types that don’t agree with you.
But not traditional philosophers, who have reliable intuitions? This is just plain silly.
But not informal frameworks, because your intuition says that formality is next to Godliness?
I would recommend turning this into a discussion-level post—I doubt anyone will find this comment, as it’s buried pretty deeply in this discussion.
Do you think people other than you will like it? I think many will complain about the style and i didn’t want to rewrite it more formally. also i dismissed most of the paper as irrelevant. i expect people to complain about that and don’t particularly expect the discussion to go anywhere.
You’d probably have to change the style, yes. And no, I don’t expect other people to like it, but I expect that they will respond. Also: you’re probably going to have to either go into more depth or pick a specific example, or both.
What’s in it for me? I think I got the gist of what less wrong has to offer already.
Can you explain how we believe that Bayesianism leads to better decisonmaking? I’m not even asking you to do it, I no longer have high expectations of productivity from this conversation and don’t intend to prolong it, but know that if you can’t, you don’t understand what we offer at all.
Good criticisms here, yet downvoted to −3. Do LWer’s really want to be less wrong?
There’s a general pattern here. Some of this comments are potentially good. But the general pattern either a) misses points b) doesn’t actually grapple with what he is claiming it does and c) is uncivil. C is a major issue. Obnoxious remarks like “But not informal frameworks, because your intuition says that formality is next to Godliness?” are going to get downvoted.
People are inclined to downvote uncvil comments for a variety of reasons: 1) They reinforce emotionalism on all members of a discussion, making the actual exchange of ideas less likely. 2) They make the individual making the comments much less likely to acknowledge when they are wrong (this is due to standard cognitive biases). 3) They make communities less pleasant.
Uncivil comments that support common beliefs are also voted down. LWians are not perfect and you shouldn’t be surprised if that is going to occur even more with comments that are uncivil and go against the consensus. In this particular case, it also doesn’t help that most of the uncivility is at the end of the comment, so one moves directly from reading the unproductive, uncivil remarks to seeing the vote button.