what you’re doing here is conflating Bayes’ theorem (which is about probability, and which is a matter of logic, and which is correct) with Bayesian epistemology (the application of Bayes’ theorem to epistemological problems, rather than to the math behind betting).
That’s because to a Bayesian, these things are the same thing. Epistemology is all about probability—and visa versa. Bayes’s theorem includes induction and confirmation. You can’t accept Bayes’s theorem and reject induction without crazy inconsistency—and Bayes’s theorem is just the math of probability theory.
If I understand correctly, I think curi is saying that there’s no reason for probability and epistemology to be the same thing. That said, I don’t entirely understand his/her argument in this thread, as some of the criticisms he/she mentions are vague. For example, what are these “epistemological problems” that Popper solves but Bayes doesn’t?
That’s because to a Bayesian, these things are the same thing. Epistemology is all about probability—and visa versa. Bayes’s theorem includes induction and confirmation. You can’t accept Bayes’s theorem and reject induction without crazy inconsistency—and Bayes’s theorem is just the math of probability theory.
If I understand correctly, I think curi is saying that there’s no reason for probability and epistemology to be the same thing. That said, I don’t entirely understand his/her argument in this thread, as some of the criticisms he/she mentions are vague. For example, what are these “epistemological problems” that Popper solves but Bayes doesn’t?