With regards to the link, it’s simply that it’s less in depth than other advice I’ve received. There are techniques that it doesn’t cover in meaningful detail, like manipulation of cognitive dissonance (habitually behaving in certain ways to convince yourself to feel certain ways,) or recognition of various cognitive biases which will alter our feelings. It’s not that bad as an introduction, but it could do a better job opening up connections to specific techniques to practice or biases to be aware of.
Popper didn’t impress me because it simply wasn’t apparent to me that he was establishing any meaningful improvements to how we go about reasoning and gaining information. Critical rationalism appeared to me to be a way of looking at how we go about the pursuit of knowledge, but to quote Feynman, “Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.” It wasn’t apparent to me that trying to become more Popperian should improve the work of scientists at all; indeed, in practice it is my observation that those who try to think of theories more in the light of the criticism they have withstood than their probability in light of the available evidence are more likely to make significant blunders.
Attempting to become more Bayesian in one’s epistemology, on the other hand, had immediately apparent benefits with regards to conducting science well (which are are discussed extensively on this site.)
I had criticisms of Popper’s arguments to offer, and could probably refresh my memory of them by revisiting his writings, but the deciding factor which kept me from bothering to read further was that, like other philosophers of science I had encountered, it simply wasn’t apparent that he had anything useful to offer, whereas it was immediately clear that Bayesianism did.
Feynman meant normal philosophers of science. Including, I think, Bayesians. He didn’t mean Popper, who he read and appreciated. Feynman himself engaged in philosophy of science, and published it. It’s academic philosophers, of the dominant type, that he loathed.
that those who try to think of theories more in the light of the criticism they have withstood than their probability in light of the available evidence
That’s not really what Popperian epistemology is about. But also: the concept of evidence for theories is a mistake that doesn’t actually make sense, as Popper explained. If you doubt this, do what no one else on this site has yet managed: tell me what “support” means (like in the phrase “supporting evidence”) and tell me how support differs from consistency.
The biggest thing Popper has to offer is the solution to justificationism which has plagued almost everyone’s thinking since Aristotle. You won’t know quite what that is because it’s an unconscious bias for most people. In short it is the idea that theories should be supported/justified/verified/proven, or whatever, whether probabilistically or not. A fraction of this is: he solved the problem of induction. Genuinely solved it, rather than simply giving up and accepting regress/foundations/circularly/whatever.
That’s not really what Popperian epistemology is about. But also: the concept of evidence for theories is a mistake that doesn’t actually make sense, as Popper explained. If you doubt this, do what no one else on this site has yet managed: tell me what “support” means (like in the phrase “supporting evidence”) and tell me how support differs from consistency.
I’ve read his arguments for this, I simply wasn’t convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.
“Support” would be data in light of which the subjective likelihood of a hypothesis is increased. If consistency does not meaningfully differ from this with respect to how we respond to data, can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?
I’d also like to add that I do know what justificationism is, and your tendency to openly assume deficiencies in the knowledge of others is rather irritating. I normally wouldn’t bother to remark upon it, but given that you posed a superior grasp of socially effective debate conduct as evidence of the strength of your epistemology, I feel the need to point out that I don’t feel like you’re meeting the standards of etiquette I would expect of most members of Less Wrong.
I’ve read his arguments for this, I simply wasn’t convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.
Yet again you disagree with no substantive argument. If you don’t have anything to say, why are you posting?
can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?
Well, consistency is good as far as it goes. If we see 10 white swans, we should reject “all swans are black” (yes, even this much depends on some other stuff). Consistency does the job without anything extraneous or misleading.
The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn’t true, except in special cases which aren’t important.
The way Popper improves on this is by noting that there are always many hypotheses consistent with the data. Saying their likelihood increases is pointless. It does not help deal with the problem of differentiating between them. Something else, not support, is needed. This leaves the concept of support with nothing useful to do, except be badly abused in sloppy arguments (I have in mind arguments I’ve seen elsewhere. Lots of them. What people do is they find some evidence, and some theory it is consistent with, and they say the theory is supported so now they have a strong argument or whatever. And they are totally selective about this. You try to tell them, “well, theory is also consistent with the data. so it’s supported just as much. right?” and they say no, theirs fits the data better, so it’s supported more. but you ask what the difference is, and they can’t tell you because there is no answer. the idea that a theory can fit the data better than another, when both are consistent with the data, is a mistake (again there are some special cases that don’t matter in practice).)
The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn’t true, except in special cases which aren’t important.
Suppose I ask a woman if she has children. She says no.
This is supporting evidence for the hypothesis that she does not have children; it raises the likelihood from my perspective that she is childless.
It is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that she has children; she would simply have to be lying.
So it appears to me that in this case, whatever arguments you might make regarding induction, viewing the data in terms of consistency does not inform my behavior as well.
This is the standard story. It is nothing but an appeal to intuition (and/or unstated background knowledge, unstated explanations, unstated assumptions, etc). There is no argument for it and there never has been one.
Refuting this common mistake is something important Popper did.
Try reading your post again. You simply assumed that her having children is more likely. That is not true from the example presented, without some unstated assumptions being added. There is no argument in your post. That makes it very difficult to argue against because there’s nothing to engage with.
It could go either way. You know it could go either way. You claim one way fits the data better, but you don’t offer any rigorous guidelines (or anything else) for figuring out which way fits better. What are the rules to decide which consistent theories are more supported than others?
Of course it could go either way. But if I behaved in everyday life as if it were equally likely to go either way, I would be subjecting myself to disaster. For practical purposes it has always served me better to accept that certain hypotheses that are consistent with the available data are more probable than others, and while I cannot prove that this makes it more likely that it will continue to do so in the future, I’m willing to bet quite heavily that it will.
If Popper’s epistemology does not lead to superior results to induction, and at best, only reduces to procedures that perform as well, then I do not see why I should regard his refutation of induction as important.
Then you have your answer: Support is non-boolean. I don’t think a boolean concept of consistency of observations with anything makes sense, though (consistent would mean P(E|H)>0, but observations never have a probability of 0 anyway, so every observation would be consistent with everything, or you’d need an arbitrary cut-off. P(observe black sheep|all sheep are white) > 0, but is very small ).
Some theories predict that some things won’t happen (0 probability). I consider this kind of theory important.
You say I have my answer, but you have not answered. I don’t think you’ve understood the problem. To try to repeat myself less, check out the discussion here, currently at the bottom:
Some theories predict that some things won’t happen (0 probability). I consider this kind of theory important.
But they don’t predict that you won’t hallucinate, or misread the experimental data, or whatever. Some things not happening doesn’t mean some things won’t be observed.
You say I have my answer, but you have not answered.
You asked how support differed form consistent. Boolean vs real number is a difference. Even if you arbitrarily decide that real numbers are not allowed and only booleans are that doesn’t mean that differentiating between their use of real numbers and your use of booleans is inconsistent on part of those who use real numbers.
With regards to the link, it’s simply that it’s less in depth than other advice I’ve received. There are techniques that it doesn’t cover in meaningful detail, like manipulation of cognitive dissonance (habitually behaving in certain ways to convince yourself to feel certain ways,) or recognition of various cognitive biases which will alter our feelings. It’s not that bad as an introduction, but it could do a better job opening up connections to specific techniques to practice or biases to be aware of.
Popper didn’t impress me because it simply wasn’t apparent to me that he was establishing any meaningful improvements to how we go about reasoning and gaining information. Critical rationalism appeared to me to be a way of looking at how we go about the pursuit of knowledge, but to quote Feynman, “Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.” It wasn’t apparent to me that trying to become more Popperian should improve the work of scientists at all; indeed, in practice it is my observation that those who try to think of theories more in the light of the criticism they have withstood than their probability in light of the available evidence are more likely to make significant blunders.
Attempting to become more Bayesian in one’s epistemology, on the other hand, had immediately apparent benefits with regards to conducting science well (which are are discussed extensively on this site.)
I had criticisms of Popper’s arguments to offer, and could probably refresh my memory of them by revisiting his writings, but the deciding factor which kept me from bothering to read further was that, like other philosophers of science I had encountered, it simply wasn’t apparent that he had anything useful to offer, whereas it was immediately clear that Bayesianism did.
Feynman meant normal philosophers of science. Including, I think, Bayesians. He didn’t mean Popper, who he read and appreciated. Feynman himself engaged in philosophy of science, and published it. It’s academic philosophers, of the dominant type, that he loathed.
That’s not really what Popperian epistemology is about. But also: the concept of evidence for theories is a mistake that doesn’t actually make sense, as Popper explained. If you doubt this, do what no one else on this site has yet managed: tell me what “support” means (like in the phrase “supporting evidence”) and tell me how support differs from consistency.
The biggest thing Popper has to offer is the solution to justificationism which has plagued almost everyone’s thinking since Aristotle. You won’t know quite what that is because it’s an unconscious bias for most people. In short it is the idea that theories should be supported/justified/verified/proven, or whatever, whether probabilistically or not. A fraction of this is: he solved the problem of induction. Genuinely solved it, rather than simply giving up and accepting regress/foundations/circularly/whatever.
I’ve read his arguments for this, I simply wasn’t convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.
“Support” would be data in light of which the subjective likelihood of a hypothesis is increased. If consistency does not meaningfully differ from this with respect to how we respond to data, can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?
I’d also like to add that I do know what justificationism is, and your tendency to openly assume deficiencies in the knowledge of others is rather irritating. I normally wouldn’t bother to remark upon it, but given that you posed a superior grasp of socially effective debate conduct as evidence of the strength of your epistemology, I feel the need to point out that I don’t feel like you’re meeting the standards of etiquette I would expect of most members of Less Wrong.
Yet again you disagree with no substantive argument. If you don’t have anything to say, why are you posting?
Well, consistency is good as far as it goes. If we see 10 white swans, we should reject “all swans are black” (yes, even this much depends on some other stuff). Consistency does the job without anything extraneous or misleading.
The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn’t true, except in special cases which aren’t important.
The way Popper improves on this is by noting that there are always many hypotheses consistent with the data. Saying their likelihood increases is pointless. It does not help deal with the problem of differentiating between them. Something else, not support, is needed. This leaves the concept of support with nothing useful to do, except be badly abused in sloppy arguments (I have in mind arguments I’ve seen elsewhere. Lots of them. What people do is they find some evidence, and some theory it is consistent with, and they say the theory is supported so now they have a strong argument or whatever. And they are totally selective about this. You try to tell them, “well, theory is also consistent with the data. so it’s supported just as much. right?” and they say no, theirs fits the data better, so it’s supported more. but you ask what the difference is, and they can’t tell you because there is no answer. the idea that a theory can fit the data better than another, when both are consistent with the data, is a mistake (again there are some special cases that don’t matter in practice).)
Suppose I ask a woman if she has children. She says no.
This is supporting evidence for the hypothesis that she does not have children; it raises the likelihood from my perspective that she is childless.
It is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that she has children; she would simply have to be lying.
So it appears to me that in this case, whatever arguments you might make regarding induction, viewing the data in terms of consistency does not inform my behavior as well.
This is the standard story. It is nothing but an appeal to intuition (and/or unstated background knowledge, unstated explanations, unstated assumptions, etc). There is no argument for it and there never has been one.
Refuting this common mistake is something important Popper did.
Try reading your post again. You simply assumed that her having children is more likely. That is not true from the example presented, without some unstated assumptions being added. There is no argument in your post. That makes it very difficult to argue against because there’s nothing to engage with.
It could go either way. You know it could go either way. You claim one way fits the data better, but you don’t offer any rigorous guidelines (or anything else) for figuring out which way fits better. What are the rules to decide which consistent theories are more supported than others?
Of course it could go either way. But if I behaved in everyday life as if it were equally likely to go either way, I would be subjecting myself to disaster. For practical purposes it has always served me better to accept that certain hypotheses that are consistent with the available data are more probable than others, and while I cannot prove that this makes it more likely that it will continue to do so in the future, I’m willing to bet quite heavily that it will.
If Popper’s epistemology does not lead to superior results to induction, and at best, only reduces to procedures that perform as well, then I do not see why I should regard his refutation of induction as important.
Support is the same thing as more consistent with that hypothesis than with the alternatives (P(E|H) >P(E|~H)).
What is “more consistent”?
Consistent = does not contradict. But you can’t not-contradict more. It’s a boolean issue.
Then you have your answer: Support is non-boolean. I don’t think a boolean concept of consistency of observations with anything makes sense, though (consistent would mean P(E|H)>0, but observations never have a probability of 0 anyway, so every observation would be consistent with everything, or you’d need an arbitrary cut-off. P(observe black sheep|all sheep are white) > 0, but is very small ).
Some theories predict that some things won’t happen (0 probability). I consider this kind of theory important.
You say I have my answer, but you have not answered. I don’t think you’ve understood the problem. To try to repeat myself less, check out the discussion here, currently at the bottom:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/54u/bayesian_epistemology_vs_popper/3urr?context=3
But they don’t predict that you won’t hallucinate, or misread the experimental data, or whatever. Some things not happening doesn’t mean some things won’t be observed.
You asked how support differed form consistent. Boolean vs real number is a difference. Even if you arbitrarily decide that real numbers are not allowed and only booleans are that doesn’t mean that differentiating between their use of real numbers and your use of booleans is inconsistent on part of those who use real numbers.