Does this mean something different than “Truth doesn’t have a moral valence”?
Cause it seems like it is trying harder to sound deep than to sound insightful. Sigh—maybe I’m just jaded by various other trying-to-sound-deep-for-its-own-sake sayings. Aka seem deep vs. is deep issues.
Does this mean something different than “Truth doesn’t have a moral valence”?
My primary interpretation was “attaching yourself to arguments obstructs your ability to seek the truth.” If you are interested in the truth, it does not matter if you or your interlocutor is wrong or right; it matters what the truth is.
Another interpretation is “is-thinking leads to accuracy, should-thinking leads to delusion.”
A third interpretation is “moralistic thinking degrades morals.” I don’t consider that interpretation interesting enough to agree or disagree with it.
It doesn’t seem to be clear whether Seng-Ts’an is talking about moral right and wrong, or the kind of “wrong” that is involved in “proving your opponent wrong” in debates. The first interpretation is just silly according to any philosophy that cares about ethics, but the second one does make a lot of sense.
“attaching yourself to arguments obstructs your ability to seek the truth”
This is probably a more plausible reading of the quote, but I think it is false. If I don’t believe I am right, or at least making an important point (such as playing devil’s advocate), I’m doubtful that my comments are relevant or helpful in figuring out what is true.
By contrast, your interpretation of the quote suggests that Professor Armstrong should be indifferent to whether particular x-risks that he has highlighted as “most dangerous” are actually the most dangerous x-risks.
Anyway, your second suggested reading is essentially my suggested reading, and I agree that your third suggested reading is not a very interesting assertion.
If I don’t believe I am right, or at least making an important point (such as playing devil’s advocate), I’m doubtful that my comments are relevant or helpful in figuring out what is true.
It may be worthwhile to consider the role of curiosity and questions.
By contrast, your interpretation of the quote suggests that Professor Armstrong should be indifferent to whether particular x-risks that he has highlighted as “most dangerous” are actually the most dangerous x-risks.
The first interpretation sees ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as the property of people, not ideas. Doing so is less helpful than seeing rightness as a property of ideas- the plain truth.
Thus, it suggests that the Professor should be indifferent to which x-risks he highlights as most dangerous, except for the criterion of danger. It would risk sorting his list incorrectly to confine himself by his opinion, his past statements on the issue, or those which avoid giving support to an enemy.
I agree that your third suggested reading is not a very interesting assertion.
I was introduced to the poem by someone who was arguing against moralistic thinking, who knows much more about this sort of poetry than I do; I mention it for completeness, as it may have been the author’s preferred interpretation.
Maybe it’s a reference to the idea that you need something more important than The Truth, so that you keep testing/refining your answer when you think you’ve got to the truth.
i’m going to reply to the quote as if it means “Truth doesn’t have a moral valence” and rebuttal that truth should be held more sacred then morals rather then simply outside of it. For example if there are two cases and case 1 leads to a morally “better” (in quotes because the word better is really a black box) outcome then case 2 but case 1 leads to hiding the truth (including hiding from it yourself) then I would have to think very specifically about it. In short I abide by the rule “That which can be destroyed by the Truth should be” but am weary that this breaks down practically in many situations. So when presented with a scenario where i would be tempted to break this principle for the “greater good” or the “morally better case” I would think long and hard about whether it is a rationalization or that i did not expend the mental effort to come up with a better third alternative.
Does this mean something different than “Truth doesn’t have a moral valence”?
Cause it seems like it is trying harder to sound deep than to sound insightful. Sigh—maybe I’m just jaded by various other trying-to-sound-deep-for-its-own-sake sayings. Aka seem deep vs. is deep issues.
My primary interpretation was “attaching yourself to arguments obstructs your ability to seek the truth.” If you are interested in the truth, it does not matter if you or your interlocutor is wrong or right; it matters what the truth is.
Another interpretation is “is-thinking leads to accuracy, should-thinking leads to delusion.”
A third interpretation is “moralistic thinking degrades morals.” I don’t consider that interpretation interesting enough to agree or disagree with it.
It doesn’t seem to be clear whether Seng-Ts’an is talking about moral right and wrong, or the kind of “wrong” that is involved in “proving your opponent wrong” in debates. The first interpretation is just silly according to any philosophy that cares about ethics, but the second one does make a lot of sense.
This is probably a more plausible reading of the quote, but I think it is false. If I don’t believe I am right, or at least making an important point (such as playing devil’s advocate), I’m doubtful that my comments are relevant or helpful in figuring out what is true.
By contrast, your interpretation of the quote suggests that Professor Armstrong should be indifferent to whether particular x-risks that he has highlighted as “most dangerous” are actually the most dangerous x-risks.
Anyway, your second suggested reading is essentially my suggested reading, and I agree that your third suggested reading is not a very interesting assertion.
It may be worthwhile to consider the role of curiosity and questions.
The first interpretation sees ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as the property of people, not ideas. Doing so is less helpful than seeing rightness as a property of ideas- the plain truth.
Thus, it suggests that the Professor should be indifferent to which x-risks he highlights as most dangerous, except for the criterion of danger. It would risk sorting his list incorrectly to confine himself by his opinion, his past statements on the issue, or those which avoid giving support to an enemy.
I was introduced to the poem by someone who was arguing against moralistic thinking, who knows much more about this sort of poetry than I do; I mention it for completeness, as it may have been the author’s preferred interpretation.
Maybe it’s a reference to the idea that you need something more important than The Truth, so that you keep testing/refining your answer when you think you’ve got to the truth.
i’m going to reply to the quote as if it means “Truth doesn’t have a moral valence” and rebuttal that truth should be held more sacred then morals rather then simply outside of it. For example if there are two cases and case 1 leads to a morally “better” (in quotes because the word better is really a black box) outcome then case 2 but case 1 leads to hiding the truth (including hiding from it yourself) then I would have to think very specifically about it. In short I abide by the rule “That which can be destroyed by the Truth should be” but am weary that this breaks down practically in many situations. So when presented with a scenario where i would be tempted to break this principle for the “greater good” or the “morally better case” I would think long and hard about whether it is a rationalization or that i did not expend the mental effort to come up with a better third alternative.