So, this is the sort of thing that’s true for almost any advocacy group: They will present the evidence that helps them and not present the evidence that doesn’t. That means that for any political advocacy or organization you need to look at the evidence with that in mind and judge it carefully and accordingly. This makes the groups under discussion no different than any other similar group.
There is a difference between selectively presenting true evidence (or at least evidence they believe to be true) and telling things you know to be false.
Valid point in this context. I’m not sure if Julian was claiming to present things that are known to be false, although the wording of the comment certainly could be interpreted that way.
Wasn’t he basically just saying that these kinds of statements radically lower his epistemic confidence in empirical claims the movement makes which are politically convenient?
Wasn’t he basically just saying that these kinds of statements radically lower his epistemic confidence in empirical claims the movement makes which are politically convenient?
Well, there’s the connotative issue involved. But my point is that he seems to be making a strange adjustment here: Making a radical adjustment to one group when it should apply to all political groups. Moreover, the comment struck me (and it is possible that I’ve misinterpreted it here) as essentially dismissing any claims made rather than doing what one should actually do in such contexts- carefully examine the claims, and look for omitted evidence.
So, this is the sort of thing that’s true for almost any advocacy group: They will present the evidence that helps them and not present the evidence that doesn’t. That means that for any political advocacy or organization you need to look at the evidence with that in mind and judge it carefully and accordingly. This makes the groups under discussion no different than any other similar group.
There is a difference between selectively presenting true evidence (or at least evidence they believe to be true) and telling things you know to be false.
Valid point in this context. I’m not sure if Julian was claiming to present things that are known to be false, although the wording of the comment certainly could be interpreted that way.
Wasn’t he basically just saying that these kinds of statements radically lower his epistemic confidence in empirical claims the movement makes which are politically convenient?
Well, there’s the connotative issue involved. But my point is that he seems to be making a strange adjustment here: Making a radical adjustment to one group when it should apply to all political groups. Moreover, the comment struck me (and it is possible that I’ve misinterpreted it here) as essentially dismissing any claims made rather than doing what one should actually do in such contexts- carefully examine the claims, and look for omitted evidence.