This isn’t much of an update to me. It’s like if you told me that a hacker broke out of the simulation, and I responded that it isn’t that surprising they did because they went to Harvard. The fact that someone did it all is the primary and massive update that it was feasible and that this level of win was attainable for humans at that time if they were smart and determined.
We’re discussing the question of whether for most people in the past, rationality was a strategy inferior to having a domain where conscious beliefs are socially expedient rather than accurate. You gave Francis Bacon as a counterexample. I pointed out that, first, Bacon was atypical along the very axes that I claim make rationality the superior choice today (having more opportunities and depending less on others). This weakens Bacon’s example as evidence against my overall thesis. Second, Bacon actually did maintain socially expedient beliefs (religion, although I’m sure it’s not the only one). There is a spectrum between average-Jane-strategy and “maximal” self-honesty, and Bacon certainly did not go all the way towards maximal self-honesty.
I think the thing I want here is a better analysis of the tradeoff and when to take it (according to one’s inside view), rather than something like an outside view account that says “probably don’t”.
(And you are indeed contributing to understanding that tradeoff, your first comment indeed gives two major reasons, but it still feels to me true to say about many people in history and not just people today.)
Suppose we plot “All people alive” on the x-axis, and “Probability you should do rationality on your inside view” on the y-axis. Here are two opinions one could have about people during the time of Bacon.
“Some people should do rationality, and most people shouldn’t.”
″Some people should not think about it, and some people should consider it regularly and sometimes do it.”
I want to express something more like the second one than the first.
This isn’t much of an update to me. It’s like if you told me that a hacker broke out of the simulation, and I responded that it isn’t that surprising they did because they went to Harvard. The fact that someone did it all is the primary and massive update that it was feasible and that this level of win was attainable for humans at that time if they were smart and determined.
We’re discussing the question of whether for most people in the past, rationality was a strategy inferior to having a domain where conscious beliefs are socially expedient rather than accurate. You gave Francis Bacon as a counterexample. I pointed out that, first, Bacon was atypical along the very axes that I claim make rationality the superior choice today (having more opportunities and depending less on others). This weakens Bacon’s example as evidence against my overall thesis. Second, Bacon actually did maintain socially expedient beliefs (religion, although I’m sure it’s not the only one). There is a spectrum between average-Jane-strategy and “maximal” self-honesty, and Bacon certainly did not go all the way towards maximal self-honesty.
I think the thing I want here is a better analysis of the tradeoff and when to take it (according to one’s inside view), rather than something like an outside view account that says “probably don’t”.
(And you are indeed contributing to understanding that tradeoff, your first comment indeed gives two major reasons, but it still feels to me true to say about many people in history and not just people today.)
Suppose we plot “All people alive” on the x-axis, and “Probability you should do rationality on your inside view” on the y-axis. Here are two opinions one could have about people during the time of Bacon.
I want to express something more like the second one than the first.