Interesting article. I’ve read some of Dick’s works and enjoyed them. I’m not sure I understand the significance to my post, though? My case seems to be the opposite, if anything. Instead of trusting my senses beyond reason, I considered much more likely that my senses (and memories) were compromised and untrustworthy.
Oh, I see, I suppose. Have you never come across the compelling logical argument that we most likely, in fact, live in a simulation (and are thus virtual entities)? I suppose I assumed that was a commonly known idea in rationalist circles, since I’ve seen it discussed frequently OUTSIDE rationalist circles.
The ultimate conclusion that I came to (and still hold) is that my medical event is neither proof for, nor against, such a scenario. Therefore, since the scenario is highly probable, it remains highly probable. But not immediately relevant.
I suppose the more extraordinary thing is that during most of my event I found it HIGHLY and urgently relevant. In particular, if my proposed scenario 2 was the case, deducing that as soon as possible would have very high expected utility. Of course, this was balanced by the fact that if scenario 2 was NOT the case, wrongly deducing that it was would lead to very maladaptive behavior, ie, behaving like a crazy person.
Phillip K. Dick thought he saw God (he had a stroke):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Exegesis_of_Philip_K._Dick
Interesting article. I’ve read some of Dick’s works and enjoyed them. I’m not sure I understand the significance to my post, though? My case seems to be the opposite, if anything. Instead of trusting my senses beyond reason, I considered much more likely that my senses (and memories) were compromised and untrustworthy.
Your title suggests your most likely explanation is sort of like Dick’s explanation—way out there.
Oh, I see, I suppose. Have you never come across the compelling logical argument that we most likely, in fact, live in a simulation (and are thus virtual entities)? I suppose I assumed that was a commonly known idea in rationalist circles, since I’ve seen it discussed frequently OUTSIDE rationalist circles.
The ultimate conclusion that I came to (and still hold) is that my medical event is neither proof for, nor against, such a scenario. Therefore, since the scenario is highly probable, it remains highly probable. But not immediately relevant.
I suppose the more extraordinary thing is that during most of my event I found it HIGHLY and urgently relevant. In particular, if my proposed scenario 2 was the case, deducing that as soon as possible would have very high expected utility. Of course, this was balanced by the fact that if scenario 2 was NOT the case, wrongly deducing that it was would lead to very maladaptive behavior, ie, behaving like a crazy person.