Once I have been told I am a decider, the expected payouts are:
For saying Yea: $10 + P$900
For saying Nay: $70 + Q$700
P is the probability that the other 8 deciders if they exist all say Yea conditioned on my saying Yay, Q is the probability that the other 8 deciders if they exist all say Nay conditioned on my saying Nay.
For Yay to be the right answer, to maximize money for African Kids, we manipulate the inequality to find
P > 89% − 78%*Q
The lowest value for P consistent with 0<=Q<=1 is
P > 11% which occurs when Q = 100%.
What are P & Q? All we are told about the other deciders if they exist is that they are “people who care about saving African kids.” With only that information, I can’t see how to rationally use anything other than ~0.5% = P = Q, that is, our prior probability that any other decider says yay or nay is 50%, so getting all 8 of them to give the same answer of Yay or Nay has prior probability of (~(1/2)^8). Any other assumption of a different prior given the statement of the problem seems irrational to me.
So with P & Q on the small side, the correct decision is to pick “Nay.” The error in the original post analysis of the case for picking Yay was assuming that the value of P is 1, that if I picked Yay that all people in the class of “people who care about African Kids” would also pick Yay. As stated above, from the information we have the rational prior estimate of that probability P is about 0.5%.
I would go further and say what about updating probabilities based on what we see in the answers here? If anything, they decrease the probability of P (everybody picks Yay), as more people seem to favor Nay than Yay. But this little bit of peeking below the fold is not needed for the estimate.
First let’s work out what joint strategy you should coordinate on beforehand. If everyone pledges to answer “yea” in case they end up as deciders, you get 0.5*1000 + 0.5*100 = 550 expected donation. Pledging to say “nay” gives 700 for sure, so it’s the better strategy.
This suggests to me that you actually can coordinate with everyone else, but the problem isn’t clear on whether or not that’s the case.
Thank you for that comment. I think I understand the question now. Let me restate it somewhat differently to make it, I think, clearer.
All 10 of us are sitting around trying to pre-decide a strategy for optimizing contributions.
The first situation we consider is labeled “First” and quoted in your comment. If deciders always say yay, we get $1000 for heads and $100 for tails which gives us an expected $550 payout. If we all say nay, we get $700 for either heads or tails. So we should predecide to say “nay.”
But then Charlie says “I think we should predecide to say “yay.” 90% of the time I am informed I am a decider, there are 8 other deciders besides me, and if we all say “yay” we get $1000. 10% of the time I am informed I am a decider, we will only get $100. But when I am informed I am a decider, the expected payout is $910 if we all say yay, and only $700 if we all say nay.”
Now Charlie is wrong, but its no good just asserting it. I have to explain why.
It is because Charlie has failed to consider the cases when he is NOT chosen as a decider. He is mistakenly thinking that since in those cases he is not chosen as a decider his decision doesn’t matter, but that is not true because we are talking about a predetermined group decision. So Charlie must recognize that in the 50% of cases where he is NOT chosen as a decider, 90% of THOSE cases are TAILS and his participation in directing the group to vote “yay” in those cases nets an expected $190 each time he is not chosen, while his participation in directing the group to vote “nay” nets $700 in each of those times when he is not chosen.
So the nub of it is that since this is a group decision, Charlie is actually a decider whether he is chosen as a decider or not, his decision, the group decision, affects the outcome of EVERY branch, not just the branches in which Charlie is an “official” decider. The nub of it is that we have equivocation on the word “decider,” when it is a group decision, when we count on every individual reaching the same decision, than every individual analyzing the situation must evaluate payout in ALL branches, and not just the ones in which the setter of the problem has chosen to label him a “decider.”
When Charlie is NOT chosen as a decider, he can conclude that tails was thrown with 90% probability and heads with only 10 probability.
Once I have been told I am a decider, the expected payouts are:
For saying Yea: $10 + P$900 For saying Nay: $70 + Q$700
P is the probability that the other 8 deciders if they exist all say Yea conditioned on my saying Yay, Q is the probability that the other 8 deciders if they exist all say Nay conditioned on my saying Nay.
For Yay to be the right answer, to maximize money for African Kids, we manipulate the inequality to find P > 89% − 78%*Q The lowest value for P consistent with 0<=Q<=1 is P > 11% which occurs when Q = 100%.
What are P & Q? All we are told about the other deciders if they exist is that they are “people who care about saving African kids.” With only that information, I can’t see how to rationally use anything other than ~0.5% = P = Q, that is, our prior probability that any other decider says yay or nay is 50%, so getting all 8 of them to give the same answer of Yay or Nay has prior probability of (~(1/2)^8). Any other assumption of a different prior given the statement of the problem seems irrational to me.
So with P & Q on the small side, the correct decision is to pick “Nay.” The error in the original post analysis of the case for picking Yay was assuming that the value of P is 1, that if I picked Yay that all people in the class of “people who care about African Kids” would also pick Yay. As stated above, from the information we have the rational prior estimate of that probability P is about 0.5%.
I would go further and say what about updating probabilities based on what we see in the answers here? If anything, they decrease the probability of P (everybody picks Yay), as more people seem to favor Nay than Yay. But this little bit of peeking below the fold is not needed for the estimate.
This suggests to me that you actually can coordinate with everyone else, but the problem isn’t clear on whether or not that’s the case.
Thank you for that comment. I think I understand the question now. Let me restate it somewhat differently to make it, I think, clearer.
All 10 of us are sitting around trying to pre-decide a strategy for optimizing contributions.
The first situation we consider is labeled “First” and quoted in your comment. If deciders always say yay, we get $1000 for heads and $100 for tails which gives us an expected $550 payout. If we all say nay, we get $700 for either heads or tails. So we should predecide to say “nay.”
But then Charlie says “I think we should predecide to say “yay.” 90% of the time I am informed I am a decider, there are 8 other deciders besides me, and if we all say “yay” we get $1000. 10% of the time I am informed I am a decider, we will only get $100. But when I am informed I am a decider, the expected payout is $910 if we all say yay, and only $700 if we all say nay.”
Now Charlie is wrong, but its no good just asserting it. I have to explain why.
It is because Charlie has failed to consider the cases when he is NOT chosen as a decider. He is mistakenly thinking that since in those cases he is not chosen as a decider his decision doesn’t matter, but that is not true because we are talking about a predetermined group decision. So Charlie must recognize that in the 50% of cases where he is NOT chosen as a decider, 90% of THOSE cases are TAILS and his participation in directing the group to vote “yay” in those cases nets an expected $190 each time he is not chosen, while his participation in directing the group to vote “nay” nets $700 in each of those times when he is not chosen.
So the nub of it is that since this is a group decision, Charlie is actually a decider whether he is chosen as a decider or not, his decision, the group decision, affects the outcome of EVERY branch, not just the branches in which Charlie is an “official” decider. The nub of it is that we have equivocation on the word “decider,” when it is a group decision, when we count on every individual reaching the same decision, than every individual analyzing the situation must evaluate payout in ALL branches, and not just the ones in which the setter of the problem has chosen to label him a “decider.” When Charlie is NOT chosen as a decider, he can conclude that tails was thrown with 90% probability and heads with only 10 probability.
Very good explanation; voted up. I would even go so far as to call it a solution.