If I follow this correctly, choices are both deterministic and non-illusory.
The traditional line of thinking is something along the lines of “if my choices are determined by something else, they are illusion, and therefore do not matter.” If the choices were illusory, then—if I have correctly understood—removal from the system would not have an effect on the system. Which is to say, ‘past’ leads to ‘choice’—I’m unsure if ‘present’ is more correct in this case—leads to ‘future’ is indistinguishable from ‘past’ leads to ‘future’
However, this is something akin to saying ‘1 + 1 = 2’ is indistinguishable from ‘1 = 2’. Both the ‘+ 1’ and ‘choice’ are integral to ‘2’ and ‘future’, respectively. Furthermore, the reverse—‘2 = 1 + 1’ and ‘future is outcome of choice that is determined by past’—also needs the middle to work correctly.
So—to relate this to terms more intuitive—the past determines the choices we are presented with and the options we take, but the future is the direct outcome of the choice, not the past. Our choices are non-illusory because they have effect. Our choices are more deterministic than we would like to think. After all, I know I like to think that I’m the only determinator in my choices, but that would ignore my thoughts on the current situation, the outcomes of similar choices made in the past, and what has happened to me recently.
Now, I wonder what happens if we have—instead of a function f(n-1) = n, where n is a node along a chain of causality—a function f(n) = n—d, where d is some distance along the chain. Put another way, what if a choice were to somehow effect what we consider the past—or, if n is negative, the future—and this discontinuous function affected the chain in such a way as to affect node n? After all, if ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are only the way we interpret causality, what prevents a chain from looping back on itself as one of many inputs.
In asking the question, I may have answered it myself. I was thinking timefully, in that adding a new node would affect an old node, where instead there are no ‘new’ or ‘old’ nodes. The nodes ‘are’.
Perhaps any node which appears to affect the chain is an illusion, and instead is merely another chain of causality that is similar to the chain being considered. The present doesn’t change the past, it links to something that looks like the past.
The argument that determinism is inimical to FW isn’t the claim that you can remove the link labelled choice without changing anything else. It is partly based on the observation that the link is not in a privileged position that should objectively make it THE cause. Not only is it not the furthest back, it is also not the nearest and most I’mmediate cause of an event, since there is always some further mechanism needed to turn a choice into a successful action.
Furthermore, deterministic “choice”doesn’t have all the expected properties of free choice. Particularly , it lacks could-have-been-otherwise.
There is no conflict between determinism and counterfactuals.
These counterfactuals are untestable, unobservable, and do not actually exist
Choose one!
We can and do test counterfactuals …by by re-running experiments with different starting conditions. The claim that …
These counterfactuals are untestable, unobservable, and do not actually exist
...is profoundly counter-scientific.
(There is serious issue about locality. We can’t rewind the universe and vary the starting conditions , we can only do so repeat a localised experiment with variations. But science works...doesn’t it.)
There is no conflict between determinism and counterfactuals.
These counterfactuals are untestable, unobservable, and do not actually exist
Choose one!
We can and do test counterfactuals by by re-running experiments with different starting conditions. The claim that
These counterfactuals are untestable, unobservable, and do not actually exist
...is profoundly counter-scientific.
(There is serious issue about locality. We can’t rewind the universe and vary the starting conditions , we can only do so repeat a localised experiment with variations. But science works...doesn’t it.)
“If I run to catch my train, I will arrive on time.”
“Had I run to catch my train, I would have arrived on time.”
These say the same thing, one from before the decision and one from after. If you reject the latter, how can you accept the former? If you reject the former, how can you run your life at all?
Consider “if I run to catch the train, i would arrive on time. I have the ability to choose to run or not. I chose not to run, and so missed the appointment. I could have chosen differently. I regret choosing as I did”
Free choice requires and depends on counterfactuals, but consists of more than counterfactuals.
Free choice requires and depends on counterfactuals, but consists of more than counterfactuals.
Then I don’t know what you mean by “free choice”. What I mean is that I go through a process of deciding; in the present example by considering the effort required, the chance of being successful, and how much it matters. When it is clear to me making that effort is the best decision, that is what I will inevitably do. That is the exercise of free will, as practically understood in real life, from where the concept comes: making decisions when one’s own consideration of the issue screens off all other causes. It is still meaningful to say afterwards, “had I not caught the train, I would have been late”, despite the inevitability of the actual decision.
People who have faced up to difficult moral decisions sometimes say afterwards words to the effect that “I could not have acted otherwise,” meaning that the right path was so clear, despite the personal sacrifice involved, that they had to take it. In saying that, they are not claiming to be blind automata.
By freechoice I mean a putative capacity that is incompatible with determinism, and which underlies common attitudes of culpability, congratulation, regret, etc.
If your decisions are inevitable, why regret them? Regret is common attitude, so the common notion choice is one where decisions aren’t inevitable.
That people do not regret some of their decisions -I could/would not have done otherwise- does indeed not mean that they regard themselves as automata whose decisions can only be inevitable. Why do you?
By freechoice I mean a putative capacity that is incompatible with determinism
Writing nondeterminism into the definition doesn’t establish anything about the real world.
and which underlies common attitudes of culpability, congratulation, regret, etc.
Common attitudes do not depend on the arguments of philosophers (although they may well get influenced by such deepities as get into the popular air). Debates about determinism show up in the law courts only to the extent that a person’s deliberation drastically fails to screen off other causes of their actions (such as insanity, drug influence, etc.). The law does not need to deal with philosophical spooks.
Now, there are any number of contemporary intellectuals, Sam Harris for example, ready to argue that there is no such thing as free will, choice is an illusion, we are all just sacks of competing brain modules, the self does not exist, nothing it true, all is a lie, and any number of such deepities. I think they’re all wrong, but I think that free will as a spooky extra-deterministic force is also wrong.
That people do not regret some of their decisions -I could/would not have done otherwise- does indeed not mean that they regard themselves as automata whose decisions can only be inevitable. Why do you?
I used the word “putative” in the hope of signaling that I was not attempting an armchair argument for the actual existence of FW. I was, however, launching an armchair argument for the incompatibilist concept of FW being the correct concept, as opposed to incompatible.ism. If it is correct, the actual existence of FW would depend on empirical factors, such as the actual existence of determinism (which is rather different to the situation if compatibilism is correct)
The arguments of philosophers should depend on common concepts, the notion of FW that people use and care about. The existence of regret shows that people care about a notion of FW that involves accessible contractual worlds. The compatibilist can only offer inaccessible worlds, ie if the Big Bang had been different, you would have been determined to do differently, whereas the incompatibilist maintains that you could have done differently by your own choice.
I dont bet onthe idea that FW is nonexistent , as per Harris, nor on the idea that it is triviallly compatible with determinism, as per Dennet. Incompatibilist FW only has to override determinism if determinism is actually the case, which is an empirical, not a conceptual issue.
If I follow this correctly, choices are both deterministic and non-illusory.
The traditional line of thinking is something along the lines of “if my choices are determined by something else, they are illusion, and therefore do not matter.” If the choices were illusory, then—if I have correctly understood—removal from the system would not have an effect on the system. Which is to say, ‘past’ leads to ‘choice’—I’m unsure if ‘present’ is more correct in this case—leads to ‘future’ is indistinguishable from ‘past’ leads to ‘future’
However, this is something akin to saying ‘1 + 1 = 2’ is indistinguishable from ‘1 = 2’. Both the ‘+ 1’ and ‘choice’ are integral to ‘2’ and ‘future’, respectively. Furthermore, the reverse—‘2 = 1 + 1’ and ‘future is outcome of choice that is determined by past’—also needs the middle to work correctly.
So—to relate this to terms more intuitive—the past determines the choices we are presented with and the options we take, but the future is the direct outcome of the choice, not the past. Our choices are non-illusory because they have effect. Our choices are more deterministic than we would like to think. After all, I know I like to think that I’m the only determinator in my choices, but that would ignore my thoughts on the current situation, the outcomes of similar choices made in the past, and what has happened to me recently.
Now, I wonder what happens if we have—instead of a function f(n-1) = n, where n is a node along a chain of causality—a function f(n) = n—d, where d is some distance along the chain. Put another way, what if a choice were to somehow effect what we consider the past—or, if n is negative, the future—and this discontinuous function affected the chain in such a way as to affect node n? After all, if ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are only the way we interpret causality, what prevents a chain from looping back on itself as one of many inputs.
In asking the question, I may have answered it myself. I was thinking timefully, in that adding a new node would affect an old node, where instead there are no ‘new’ or ‘old’ nodes. The nodes ‘are’.
Perhaps any node which appears to affect the chain is an illusion, and instead is merely another chain of causality that is similar to the chain being considered. The present doesn’t change the past, it links to something that looks like the past.
The argument that determinism is inimical to FW isn’t the claim that you can remove the link labelled choice without changing anything else. It is partly based on the observation that the link is not in a privileged position that should objectively make it THE cause. Not only is it not the furthest back, it is also not the nearest and most I’mmediate cause of an event, since there is always some further mechanism needed to turn a choice into a successful action.
Furthermore, deterministic “choice”doesn’t have all the expected properties of free choice. Particularly , it lacks could-have-been-otherwise.
There is no conflict between determinism and counterfactuals.
“Had this tumbler been made of plastic instead of glass, it would not have broken when it fell on the floor.”
“Had Krakatoa not erupted, the remarkable sunsets subsequently seen around the world would not have happened.”
“Had Mars been larger, it would have retained a denser atmosphere.”
And a favorite on LessWrong:
“Had the millionth digit of pi been 0, this program to calculate it would have output 0.”
Choose one!
We can and do test counterfactuals …by by re-running experiments with different starting conditions. The claim that …
...is profoundly counter-scientific.
(There is serious issue about locality. We can’t rewind the universe and vary the starting conditions , we can only do so repeat a localised experiment with variations. But science works...doesn’t it.)
Choose one!
We can and do test counterfactuals by by re-running experiments with different starting conditions. The claim that
...is profoundly counter-scientific.
(There is serious issue about locality. We can’t rewind the universe and vary the starting conditions , we can only do so repeat a localised experiment with variations. But science works...doesn’t it.)
Therefore such counterfactuals are not the right model for free choice. In particular, they are not an ability someone can exercise.
Compare and contrast:
“If I run to catch my train, I will arrive on time.”
“Had I run to catch my train, I would have arrived on time.”
These say the same thing, one from before the decision and one from after. If you reject the latter, how can you accept the former? If you reject the former, how can you run your life at all?
Consider “if I run to catch the train, i would arrive on time. I have the ability to choose to run or not. I chose not to run, and so missed the appointment. I could have chosen differently. I regret choosing as I did”
Free choice requires and depends on counterfactuals, but consists of more than counterfactuals.
Then I don’t know what you mean by “free choice”. What I mean is that I go through a process of deciding; in the present example by considering the effort required, the chance of being successful, and how much it matters. When it is clear to me making that effort is the best decision, that is what I will inevitably do. That is the exercise of free will, as practically understood in real life, from where the concept comes: making decisions when one’s own consideration of the issue screens off all other causes. It is still meaningful to say afterwards, “had I not caught the train, I would have been late”, despite the inevitability of the actual decision.
People who have faced up to difficult moral decisions sometimes say afterwards words to the effect that “I could not have acted otherwise,” meaning that the right path was so clear, despite the personal sacrifice involved, that they had to take it. In saying that, they are not claiming to be blind automata.
By freechoice I mean a putative capacity that is incompatible with determinism, and which underlies common attitudes of culpability, congratulation, regret, etc.
If your decisions are inevitable, why regret them? Regret is common attitude, so the common notion choice is one where decisions aren’t inevitable.
That people do not regret some of their decisions -I could/would not have done otherwise- does indeed not mean that they regard themselves as automata whose decisions can only be inevitable. Why do you?
Writing nondeterminism into the definition doesn’t establish anything about the real world.
Common attitudes do not depend on the arguments of philosophers (although they may well get influenced by such deepities as get into the popular air). Debates about determinism show up in the law courts only to the extent that a person’s deliberation drastically fails to screen off other causes of their actions (such as insanity, drug influence, etc.). The law does not need to deal with philosophical spooks.
Now, there are any number of contemporary intellectuals, Sam Harris for example, ready to argue that there is no such thing as free will, choice is an illusion, we are all just sacks of competing brain modules, the self does not exist, nothing it true, all is a lie, and any number of such deepities. I think they’re all wrong, but I think that free will as a spooky extra-deterministic force is also wrong.
I don’t.
I used the word “putative” in the hope of signaling that I was not attempting an armchair argument for the actual existence of FW. I was, however, launching an armchair argument for the incompatibilist concept of FW being the correct concept, as opposed to incompatible.ism. If it is correct, the actual existence of FW would depend on empirical factors, such as the actual existence of determinism (which is rather different to the situation if compatibilism is correct)
The arguments of philosophers should depend on common concepts, the notion of FW that people use and care about. The existence of regret shows that people care about a notion of FW that involves accessible contractual worlds. The compatibilist can only offer inaccessible worlds, ie if the Big Bang had been different, you would have been determined to do differently, whereas the incompatibilist maintains that you could have done differently by your own choice.
I dont bet onthe idea that FW is nonexistent , as per Harris, nor on the idea that it is triviallly compatible with determinism, as per Dennet. Incompatibilist FW only has to override determinism if determinism is actually the case, which is an empirical, not a conceptual issue.