I used the word “putative” in the hope of signaling that I was not attempting an armchair argument for the actual existence of FW. I was, however, launching an armchair argument for the incompatibilist concept of FW being the correct concept, as opposed to incompatible.ism. If it is correct, the actual existence of FW would depend on empirical factors, such as the actual existence of determinism (which is rather different to the situation if compatibilism is correct)
The arguments of philosophers should depend on common concepts, the notion of FW that people use and care about. The existence of regret shows that people care about a notion of FW that involves accessible contractual worlds. The compatibilist can only offer inaccessible worlds, ie if the Big Bang had been different, you would have been determined to do differently, whereas the incompatibilist maintains that you could have done differently by your own choice.
I dont bet onthe idea that FW is nonexistent , as per Harris, nor on the idea that it is triviallly compatible with determinism, as per Dennet. Incompatibilist FW only has to override determinism if determinism is actually the case, which is an empirical, not a conceptual issue.
I used the word “putative” in the hope of signaling that I was not attempting an armchair argument for the actual existence of FW. I was, however, launching an armchair argument for the incompatibilist concept of FW being the correct concept, as opposed to incompatible.ism. If it is correct, the actual existence of FW would depend on empirical factors, such as the actual existence of determinism (which is rather different to the situation if compatibilism is correct)
The arguments of philosophers should depend on common concepts, the notion of FW that people use and care about. The existence of regret shows that people care about a notion of FW that involves accessible contractual worlds. The compatibilist can only offer inaccessible worlds, ie if the Big Bang had been different, you would have been determined to do differently, whereas the incompatibilist maintains that you could have done differently by your own choice.
I dont bet onthe idea that FW is nonexistent , as per Harris, nor on the idea that it is triviallly compatible with determinism, as per Dennet. Incompatibilist FW only has to override determinism if determinism is actually the case, which is an empirical, not a conceptual issue.