Two excepts:
” The data that an observer just like us has access to includes not only our physical environment, but all of the (purported) memories and knowledge in our brains. In a randomly-fluctuating scenario, there’s no reason for this “knowledge” to have any correlation whatsoever with the world outside our immediate sensory reach. In particular, it’s overwhelmingly likely that everything we think we know about the laws of physics, and the cosmological model we have constructed that predicts we are likely to be random fluctuations, has randomly fluctuated into our heads. There is certainly no reason to trust that our knowledge is accurate, or that we have correctly deduced the predictions of this cosmological model.”—my thought in https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.00850.pdf
“If we discover that a certain otherwise innocuous cosmological model doesn’t allow us to have a reasonable degree of confidence in science and the empirical method, it makes sense to reject that model, if only on pragmatic grounds”
My opinion:
I agree with idea that BB can’t know is he BB or not, and wrote about it on LessWrong, but it is not the basis to conclude that BB-theory has zero probability. We can’t put zero probability to theories if we don’t like them, because it is great way to start to ignore any cognitive biases.
My position: There is no problem to be BB:
1) If nothing else exist, different BB states are connected with each other like digits in natural set, and this way of their connection create almost normal world, and it may have some testable predictions. (Dust theory)
2) If special type of BB, called BB-AIs exist and dominate landscape, such BB-AIs create simulations which are full of human minds, so we are probably in one of them. (The idea is that superintelligent computers are more probable than messy human minds and so are more often type of BB; Or if any BB-AI create more human simulations than random BB appear)
3) If real world exist and BB exist, each BB correspond to some state in real world. As any observer should think as of all sets of similar observers under UDT, it means that I can’t be BB, but I am number of BB plus some real me. And I could ignore BB-part of me, because some form of “quantum immortality”, every second transfer dead BBs into the “real me”. In short: “Big world immortality” completely neutralise BB problem.
“Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad” by Sean M. Carroll https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.00850.pdf
Two excepts: ” The data that an observer just like us has access to includes not only our physical environment, but all of the (purported) memories and knowledge in our brains. In a randomly-fluctuating scenario, there’s no reason for this “knowledge” to have any correlation whatsoever with the world outside our immediate sensory reach. In particular, it’s overwhelmingly likely that everything we think we know about the laws of physics, and the cosmological model we have constructed that predicts we are likely to be random fluctuations, has randomly fluctuated into our heads. There is certainly no reason to trust that our knowledge is accurate, or that we have correctly deduced the predictions of this cosmological model.”—my thought in https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.00850.pdf
“If we discover that a certain otherwise innocuous cosmological model doesn’t allow us to have a reasonable degree of confidence in science and the empirical method, it makes sense to reject that model, if only on pragmatic grounds”
My opinion: I agree with idea that BB can’t know is he BB or not, and wrote about it on LessWrong, but it is not the basis to conclude that BB-theory has zero probability. We can’t put zero probability to theories if we don’t like them, because it is great way to start to ignore any cognitive biases.
My position: There is no problem to be BB:
1) If nothing else exist, different BB states are connected with each other like digits in natural set, and this way of their connection create almost normal world, and it may have some testable predictions. (Dust theory)
2) If special type of BB, called BB-AIs exist and dominate landscape, such BB-AIs create simulations which are full of human minds, so we are probably in one of them. (The idea is that superintelligent computers are more probable than messy human minds and so are more often type of BB; Or if any BB-AI create more human simulations than random BB appear)
3) If real world exist and BB exist, each BB correspond to some state in real world. As any observer should think as of all sets of similar observers under UDT, it means that I can’t be BB, but I am number of BB plus some real me. And I could ignore BB-part of me, because some form of “quantum immortality”, every second transfer dead BBs into the “real me”. In short: “Big world immortality” completely neutralise BB problem.