Not right at all. The original and the modified Newcomb’s problems are disguised as decision theory problems. Your formulation takes the illusion of decision making out of it.
If you believe that you have the power to make decisions, then the problems are not “functionally equivalent”. If you don’t believe that you have the power to make decisions, then there is no problem or paradox, just a set of observations. you can’t have it both ways. Either you live in the world where agents and decisions are possible, or you do not. You have to pick one of the two assumptions, since they are mutually exclusive.
I have talked about a self-consistent way to present both in my old post.
Not right at all. The original and the modified Newcomb’s problems are disguised as decision theory problems. Your formulation takes the illusion of decision making out of it.
If you believe that you have the power to make decisions, then the problems are not “functionally equivalent”. If you don’t believe that you have the power to make decisions, then there is no problem or paradox, just a set of observations. you can’t have it both ways. Either you live in the world where agents and decisions are possible, or you do not. You have to pick one of the two assumptions, since they are mutually exclusive.
I have talked about a self-consistent way to present both in my old post.