I’m going to get hazy here, but I think the following answers are at least consistent:
Let’s say you create a model of (the brain of) a new person on a computer, but you don’t run the brain yet. Can you say the person hasn’t been “born” yet?
Yes.
Are we morally obliged to run his brain (so that he can live)?
No.
Compare this to a person who is in a coma. He currently has no preferences, he would’ve preferred to live longer, if he were awake, but the same thing applies to the brain in the computer that’s not running.
They are not equivalent, because the person in the coma did live.
Additionally, it seem life extensionists also should commit to the resurrection of everyone who’s ever lived, since they also wanted to continue living, and it could be said that being “dead” is just a temporary state.
Yes, I do think life extensionists are committed to this. I think this is why they endorse Cryonics.
They are not equivalent, because the person in the coma did live.
Well it seems it comes down to the above being something like a terminal value (if those even exist). I personally can’t see how it’s justified that a certain mind that had happened (by chance) to exist at some point in time is more morally significant than other minds that would equally like to be alive, but hadn’t had the chance to have been created. It’s just arbitrary.
Upon further reflection, I think I was much too hasty in my discussion here. You said that “Compare this to a person who is in a coma. He currently has no preferences”. How do we know the person in the coma has no pereferences?
I’m going to agree that if the person has no preferences, then there is nothing normatively significant about that person. This means we don’t have to turn the robot on, we don’t have to resurrect dead people, we don’t have to oppose all abortion, and we don’t have to have as much procreative sex as possible.
On this further reflection, I’m confused as to what your objection is or how it makes life extension and replacement even. As the original comment says, life extension satisfies existing preferences whereas replacement does not, because no such preferences exist.
I’m going to get hazy here, but I think the following answers are at least consistent:
Yes.
No.
They are not equivalent, because the person in the coma did live.
Yes, I do think life extensionists are committed to this. I think this is why they endorse Cryonics.
Well it seems it comes down to the above being something like a terminal value (if those even exist). I personally can’t see how it’s justified that a certain mind that had happened (by chance) to exist at some point in time is more morally significant than other minds that would equally like to be alive, but hadn’t had the chance to have been created. It’s just arbitrary.
Upon further reflection, I think I was much too hasty in my discussion here. You said that “Compare this to a person who is in a coma. He currently has no preferences”. How do we know the person in the coma has no pereferences?
I’m going to agree that if the person has no preferences, then there is nothing normatively significant about that person. This means we don’t have to turn the robot on, we don’t have to resurrect dead people, we don’t have to oppose all abortion, and we don’t have to have as much procreative sex as possible.
On this further reflection, I’m confused as to what your objection is or how it makes life extension and replacement even. As the original comment says, life extension satisfies existing preferences whereas replacement does not, because no such preferences exist.