I agree with parts of that. I’d also add the following (or I’d be curious why they’re not important effects):
Slower takeoff → warning shots → improved governance (e.g. through most/all major actors getting clear[er] evidence of risks) → less pressure to rush
(As OP argued) Shorter timelines → China has less of a chance to have leading AI companies → less pressure to rush
More broadly though, maybe we should be using more fine-grained concepts than “shorter timelines” and “slower takeoffs”:
The salient effects of “shorter timelines” seem pretty dependent on what the baseline is.
The point about China seems important if the baseline is 30 years, and not so much if the baseline is 10 years.
The salient effects of “slowing takeoff” seem pretty dependent on what part of the curve is being slowed. Slowing it down right before there’s large risk seems much more valuable than (just) slowing it down earlier in the curve, as the last few year’s investments in LLMs did.
Slower takeoff → warning shots → improved governance (e.g. through most/all major actors getting clear[er] evidence of risks) → less pressure to rush
Agree that this is an effect. The reason it wasn’t immediately as salient is because I don’t expect the governance upside to outweigh the downside of more time for competition. I’m not confident of this and I’m not going to write down reasons right now.
(As OP argued) Shorter timelines → China has less of a chance to have leading AI companies → less pressure to rush
Agree, though I think on the current margin US companies have several years of lead time on China, which is much more than they have on each other. So on the current margin, I’m more worried about companies racing each other than nations.
More broadly though, maybe we should be using more fine-grained concepts than “shorter timelines” and “slower takeoffs”:
The salient effects of “shorter timelines” seem pretty dependent on what the baseline is.
The point about China seems very important if the baseline is 30 years, and not so much if the baseline is 10 years.
The salient effects of “slowing takeoff” seem pretty dependent on what part of the curve is being slowed. Slowing it down right before there’s large risk seems much more valuable than (just) slowing it down earlier in the curve, as the last few year’s investments in LLMs did.
I agree with parts of that. I’d also add the following (or I’d be curious why they’re not important effects):
Slower takeoff → warning shots → improved governance (e.g. through most/all major actors getting clear[er] evidence of risks) → less pressure to rush
(As OP argued) Shorter timelines → China has less of a chance to have leading AI companies → less pressure to rush
More broadly though, maybe we should be using more fine-grained concepts than “shorter timelines” and “slower takeoffs”:
The salient effects of “shorter timelines” seem pretty dependent on what the baseline is.
The point about China seems important if the baseline is 30 years, and not so much if the baseline is 10 years.
The salient effects of “slowing takeoff” seem pretty dependent on what part of the curve is being slowed. Slowing it down right before there’s large risk seems much more valuable than (just) slowing it down earlier in the curve, as the last few year’s investments in LLMs did.
Agree that this is an effect. The reason it wasn’t immediately as salient is because I don’t expect the governance upside to outweigh the downside of more time for competition. I’m not confident of this and I’m not going to write down reasons right now.
Agree, though I think on the current margin US companies have several years of lead time on China, which is much more than they have on each other. So on the current margin, I’m more worried about companies racing each other than nations.
Agreed.