I just read that essay and I disagree with it. Stating one’s points of disagreement amounts to giving the diffs between your mind and that of an author. What’s good practice for scientific papers (in terms of remaining dispassionate) is probably good practice in general. The way to solve the cooperation problem is not to cancel out professing disagreement with professing agreement, it’s to track group members’ beliefs (e.g. by polling them) and act as a group on whatever the group consensus happens to be. In other words, teach people the value of majoritarianism and its ilk and tell them to use this outside view when making decisions.
What’s good practice for scientific papers (in terms of remaining dispassionate) is probably good practice in general.
In terms of epistemic rationality, you can get by fine by raising only points of disagreement and keeping it implicit that you accept everything you do not dispute. But in terms of creating effective group cooperation, which has instrumental value, this strategy performs poorly.
I just read that essay and I disagree with it. Stating one’s points of disagreement amounts to giving the diffs between your mind and that of an author. What’s good practice for scientific papers (in terms of remaining dispassionate) is probably good practice in general. The way to solve the cooperation problem is not to cancel out professing disagreement with professing agreement, it’s to track group members’ beliefs (e.g. by polling them) and act as a group on whatever the group consensus happens to be. In other words, teach people the value of majoritarianism and its ilk and tell them to use this outside view when making decisions.
In terms of epistemic rationality, you can get by fine by raising only points of disagreement and keeping it implicit that you accept everything you do not dispute. But in terms of creating effective group cooperation, which has instrumental value, this strategy performs poorly.