My current most serious quibble with the Sequences is that they do not make it clear that the map/territory meme is just a model. A very useful one in many contexts, but still only a model. One case where it fails miserably is QM, leading to the wasteful discussions of MWI vs collapse (which one is “the territory”?).
The other, minor one, is that it makes amateurs honestly think that they can do better than domain experts, just by reading the Sequences:
I think mainstream science is too slow and we mere mortals can do better with Bayes.
There are so many fallacies in this statement, I don’t even know where to start.
My current most serious quibble with the Sequences is that they do not make it clear that the map/territory meme is just a model. A very useful one in many contexts, but still only a model.
Are you claiming that the map/territory distinction is in the map, not in the territory?
One case where it fails miserably is QM, leading to the wasteful discussions of MWI vs collapse (which one is “the territory”?).
Neither one. They’re both maps. The territory is that stuff out there that surprises us sometimes.
Are you claiming that the map/territory distinction is in the map, not in the territory?
No, I don’t presume the existence of something you call the territory (an absolute immutable and unobservable entity, of which only some weak glimpses can be experienced). I’m pretty happy with a hierarchy of models as ontologically fundamental, and map/territory being one of those models.
Neither one. They’re both maps. The territory is that stuff out there that surprises us sometimes.
My issue is people arguing which of the two identically powerful models corresponds to “that stuff out there”. Once you realize that the “stuff out there” is a [meta-]model, such an argument loses its appeal.
I don’t think you and I are talking about the same thing when we refer to “the map/territory distinction”.
The way I use the “map/territory” expression, it doesn’t make sense to ask which of MWI or collapse “is the territory”. Both are relatively high-level analogies for explaining (in English) the mathematical models (in algebra) that describe the results (numerical measurements) of physics experiments. In other words, they are both “maps of maps of maps of the territory.”
We can ask which map introduces fewer extraneous terms, or leads to less confusion, or is more internally consistent; or which is more “physical” and less “magical”; but neither one “is the territory”.
I don’t presume the existence of something you call the territory (an absolute immutable and unobservable entity, of which only some weak glimpses can be experienced). I’m pretty happy with a hierarchy of models as ontologically fundamental, and map/territory being one of those models.
It seems to me that this sort of subjectivism runs into difficulty when we notice that sometimes our models are wrong; sometimes the map has a river on it that the territory doesn’t, and that as result if we dive into it we go crash instead of splash. See the ending of “The Simple Truth”. But perhaps I have misconstrued what you’re getting at here?
We can ask which map introduces fewer extraneous terms, or leads to less confusion, or is more internally consistent; or which is more “physical” and less “magical”; but neither one “is the territory”.
If you do not assign any ontology to your mathematically identical maps, then there is no way to rate them in any objective way. (I don’t consider “feel good” an objective way, since people disagree on what feels good.)
It seems to me that this sort of subjectivism runs into difficulty when we notice that sometimes our models are wrong; sometimes the map has a river on it that the territory doesn’t, and that as result if we dive into it we go crash instead of splash. See the ending of “The Simple Truth”. But perhaps I have misconstrued what you’re getting at here?
Yeah, I expected that this cute story would come up. First, my approach can be classified as instrumentalism or even anti-realism, but not subjectivism. The difference is that when models do not match experience, they are adjusted or discarded. In the case of “The Simple Truth”, there is an overwhelming experimental evidence that jumping off a cliff does not let one fly, so the Mark’s model would be discarded as failed.
I think mainstream science is too slow and we mere mortals can do better with Bayes.
There are so many fallacies in this statement, I don’t even know where to start.
Start anywhere. I’d be interested in seeing a list.
Even in extreme cases I can only count 1 fallacy per statement, and I can only parse the above into at most 2 propositions. In normal cases I only expect to see 1 per argument, and what you quoted does not appear to be an argument at all. And despite being something of an expert on logic, I don’t see a single fallacy in that.
My current most serious quibble with the Sequences is that they do not make it clear that the map/territory meme is just a model. A very useful one in many contexts, but still only a model. One case where it fails miserably is QM, leading to the wasteful discussions of MWI vs collapse (which one is “the territory”?).
The other, minor one, is that it makes amateurs honestly think that they can do better than domain experts, just by reading the Sequences:
There are so many fallacies in this statement, I don’t even know where to start.
Are you claiming that the map/territory distinction is in the map, not in the territory?
Neither one. They’re both maps. The territory is that stuff out there that surprises us sometimes.
No, I don’t presume the existence of something you call the territory (an absolute immutable and unobservable entity, of which only some weak glimpses can be experienced). I’m pretty happy with a hierarchy of models as ontologically fundamental, and map/territory being one of those models.
My issue is people arguing which of the two identically powerful models corresponds to “that stuff out there”. Once you realize that the “stuff out there” is a [meta-]model, such an argument loses its appeal.
I don’t think you and I are talking about the same thing when we refer to “the map/territory distinction”.
The way I use the “map/territory” expression, it doesn’t make sense to ask which of MWI or collapse “is the territory”. Both are relatively high-level analogies for explaining (in English) the mathematical models (in algebra) that describe the results (numerical measurements) of physics experiments. In other words, they are both “maps of maps of maps of the territory.”
We can ask which map introduces fewer extraneous terms, or leads to less confusion, or is more internally consistent; or which is more “physical” and less “magical”; but neither one “is the territory”.
It seems to me that this sort of subjectivism runs into difficulty when we notice that sometimes our models are wrong; sometimes the map has a river on it that the territory doesn’t, and that as result if we dive into it we go crash instead of splash. See the ending of “The Simple Truth”. But perhaps I have misconstrued what you’re getting at here?
If you do not assign any ontology to your mathematically identical maps, then there is no way to rate them in any objective way. (I don’t consider “feel good” an objective way, since people disagree on what feels good.)
Yeah, I expected that this cute story would come up. First, my approach can be classified as instrumentalism or even anti-realism, but not subjectivism. The difference is that when models do not match experience, they are adjusted or discarded. In the case of “The Simple Truth”, there is an overwhelming experimental evidence that jumping off a cliff does not let one fly, so the Mark’s model would be discarded as failed.
Start anywhere. I’d be interested in seeing a list.
Even in extreme cases I can only count 1 fallacy per statement, and I can only parse the above into at most 2 propositions. In normal cases I only expect to see 1 per argument, and what you quoted does not appear to be an argument at all. And despite being something of an expert on logic, I don’t see a single fallacy in that.
If you insist...
Implication that reading a pop-psych forum on the net can replace postgrad degrees and the related experience.
Assuming that Bayesian logic somehow replaces extensive experimental testing (to be fair, EY proclaims this kind of nonsense, as well).
Rushing to conclusions based on a very limited second-hand information.
Not noticing that the author the Sequences, while very articulate, is not, by any objective metric, a domain expert in any of the areas covered.
There is more, but this is a start.
It looks like you’re reading a lot into that statement. I certainly didn’t read anything against “extensive experimental testing”.
I don’t feel as confused as I was. I think we’re just using different definitions of “fallacy”.