I think it does makes sense to consider them as particular cases of a more general concept, after all. Grammatical rules and the rules of chess would be other instances, somewhere in between.
They are all regularities, but laws of physics are regularities that people notice (or try to notice), while legal laws and chess rules are regularities that people impose. (Grammar rules as linguists study them are more like physics; grammar rules as language teachers teach them are more like chess rules.)
OK… let’s add one more intermediate point and consider the laws of a cellular automaton. I can see analogies both between them and the laws of our universe¹ and the analogies between them and the rules of chess.
And mathematical realists à la Tegmark would see them even more easily than me.
I think it does makes sense to consider them as particular cases of a more general concept, after all. Grammatical rules and the rules of chess would be other instances, somewhere in between.
They are all regularities, but laws of physics are regularities that people notice (or try to notice), while legal laws and chess rules are regularities that people impose. (Grammar rules as linguists study them are more like physics; grammar rules as language teachers teach them are more like chess rules.)
OK… let’s add one more intermediate point and consider the laws of a cellular automaton. I can see analogies both between them and the laws of our universe¹ and the analogies between them and the rules of chess.
And mathematical realists à la Tegmark would see them even more easily than me.