Don’t know if that’ll solve matters, just trying.
This does seem very Popperian—in a bad way, in that it’s an oversimplified approach to theory-formation. What do you think about Kuhn, who finds this kind of reinforcement in normal, productive science—but still allows a distinction between evidence-based science and entirely circular nonscience? What about the idea that we have ‘rings’ of beliefs, and will sacrifice any number of ‘outer-ring’ theory detail to preserve our core beliefs?
Don’t know if that’ll solve matters, just trying. This does seem very Popperian—in a bad way, in that it’s an oversimplified approach to theory-formation. What do you think about Kuhn, who finds this kind of reinforcement in normal, productive science—but still allows a distinction between evidence-based science and entirely circular nonscience? What about the idea that we have ‘rings’ of beliefs, and will sacrifice any number of ‘outer-ring’ theory detail to preserve our core beliefs?