It seems to be the other way around with Bayesian techniques because of a stronger built-in assumption that your assumptions are justified. You can immunize yourself against any particular evidence by having a sufficiently wrong prior.
But you won’t be able to convince other Bayesians who don’t share that radically wrong prior. Similarly, there doesn’t seem to be something intrinsic to frequentism that keeps you from being persistently wrong. Rather, frequentists are kept in line because, as Cyan said, they have to persuade each other. Fortunately, for Bayesians and frequentists alike, a technique’s being persuasive to the community correlates with its being liable to produce less wrong answers.
But you won’t be able to convince other Bayesians who don’t share that radically wrong prior. Similarly, there doesn’t seem to be something intrinsic to frequentism that keeps you from being persistently wrong. Rather, frequentists are kept in line because, as Cyan said, they have to persuade each other. Fortunately, for Bayesians and frequentists alike, a technique’s being persuasive to the community correlates with its being liable to produce less wrong answers.