People usually are not mistaken about what they themselves believe—though there are certain exceptions to this rule—yet nonetheless, the map of the map is usually accurate, i.e., people are usually right about the question of what they believe:
I’m not at all sure about this part—although I don’t think it matters much to your overall case. I think one of our senses is a very much simplified representation of our own internal thought state. It’s only just about good enough for us to make a chain of thought—taking the substance of a finished thought and using it as input to the next thought. In animals, I suspect this sense isn’t good enough to allow thought chains to be made - and so they can’t make arguments. In humans it is good enough, but probably not by very much—it seems rather likely that the ability to make thought chains evolved quite recently.
I think we probably make mistakes about what we think we think all the time—but there is usually nobody who can correct us.
I’m not at all sure about this part—although I don’t think it matters much to your overall case. I think one of our senses is a very much simplified representation of our own internal thought state. It’s only just about good enough for us to make a chain of thought—taking the substance of a finished thought and using it as input to the next thought. In animals, I suspect this sense isn’t good enough to allow thought chains to be made - and so they can’t make arguments. In humans it is good enough, but probably not by very much—it seems rather likely that the ability to make thought chains evolved quite recently.
I think we probably make mistakes about what we think we think all the time—but there is usually nobody who can correct us.