A proposition P is meaningful if and only if P and not-P would imply different perceptions for a hypothetical entity which perceives all existing things.
(This is not any kind of argument for the actual existence of a god. Downvote if you wish, but please not due to that potential misunderstanding.)
No, in fact it works better on the assumption that there is no such entity.
If it could be an existing entity, then we could construct a paradoxical proposition, such as P=”There exists an object unperceived by anything.”, which could not be consistently evaluated as meaningful or unmeaningful. Treating a “perceiver of all existing things” as a purely hypothetical entity—a cognitive tool, not a reality—avoids such paradoxes.
If there’s an all-seeing deity, P is well-formed, meaningful, and false. Every object is perceived by the deity, including the deity itself. If there’s no all-seeing deity, the deity pops into hypothetical existence outside the real world, and evaluates P for possible perceiving anythings inside the real world; P is meaningful and likely true.
But that’s not what I was talking about. I’m talking about logical possibility, not existence. It’s okay to have a theory that talks about squares even though you haven’t built any perfect squares, and even if the laws of physics forbid it, because you have formal systems where squares exist. So you can ask “What is the smallest square that encompasses this shape?”, with a hypothetical square. But you can’t ask “What is the smallest square circle that encompasses this shape?”, because square circles are logically impossible.
I’m having a hard time finding an example of an impossible deity, not just a Turing-underpowered one, or one that doesn’t look at enough branches of a forking system. Maybe a universe where libertarian free will is true, and the deity must predict at 6AM what any agent will do at 7AM—but of course I snuck in the logical impossibility by assuming libertarian free will.
Huh? We’re talking past each other here.
… I’m talking about logical possibility, not existence.
Oh, oops. My mental model was this: Consider an all-perceiving entity (APE) such that, for all actually existing X, APE magically perceives X. That’s all of the APE’s properties—I’m not talking about classical theism or the God of any particular religion—so it doesn’t look to me like there are logical problems.
If there’s an all-seeing deity, P is well-formed, meaningful, and false. Every object is perceived by the deity, including the deity itself. If there’s no all-seeing deity, the deity pops into hypothetical existence outside the real world, and evaluates P for possible perceiving anythings inside the real world; P is meaningful and likely true.
Mostly agreed. But that’s not the GEV verificationism I suggested. The above paragraph takes the form “Evaluate P given APE” and “Evaluate P given no-APE”. My suggestion is the reverse; it takes the form “Evaluate APE’s perceptions given P” and “Evaluate APE’s perceptions given not-P”. If the great APE counts as a real thing, what would its set of perceptions be given that there exists an object unperceived by anything? That’s simply to build a contradiction: APE sees everything, and there’s something APE doesn’t see. But if the all-perceiving entity is assumed not to be a real thing, the problem goes away.
“God’s-eye-view” verificationism
A proposition P is meaningful if and only if P and not-P would imply different perceptions for a hypothetical entity which perceives all existing things.
(This is not any kind of argument for the actual existence of a god. Downvote if you wish, but please not due to that potential misunderstanding.)
Doesn’t that require such an entity to be logically possible?
No, in fact it works better on the assumption that there is no such entity.
If it could be an existing entity, then we could construct a paradoxical proposition, such as P=”There exists an object unperceived by anything.”, which could not be consistently evaluated as meaningful or unmeaningful. Treating a “perceiver of all existing things” as a purely hypothetical entity—a cognitive tool, not a reality—avoids such paradoxes.
Huh? We’re talking past each other here.
If there’s an all-seeing deity, P is well-formed, meaningful, and false. Every object is perceived by the deity, including the deity itself. If there’s no all-seeing deity, the deity pops into hypothetical existence outside the real world, and evaluates P for possible perceiving anythings inside the real world; P is meaningful and likely true.
But that’s not what I was talking about. I’m talking about logical possibility, not existence. It’s okay to have a theory that talks about squares even though you haven’t built any perfect squares, and even if the laws of physics forbid it, because you have formal systems where squares exist. So you can ask “What is the smallest square that encompasses this shape?”, with a hypothetical square. But you can’t ask “What is the smallest square circle that encompasses this shape?”, because square circles are logically impossible.
I’m having a hard time finding an example of an impossible deity, not just a Turing-underpowered one, or one that doesn’t look at enough branches of a forking system. Maybe a universe where libertarian free will is true, and the deity must predict at 6AM what any agent will do at 7AM—but of course I snuck in the logical impossibility by assuming libertarian free will.
Oh, oops. My mental model was this: Consider an all-perceiving entity (APE) such that, for all actually existing X, APE magically perceives X. That’s all of the APE’s properties—I’m not talking about classical theism or the God of any particular religion—so it doesn’t look to me like there are logical problems.
Mostly agreed. But that’s not the GEV verificationism I suggested. The above paragraph takes the form “Evaluate P given APE” and “Evaluate P given no-APE”. My suggestion is the reverse; it takes the form “Evaluate APE’s perceptions given P” and “Evaluate APE’s perceptions given not-P”. If the great APE counts as a real thing, what would its set of perceptions be given that there exists an object unperceived by anything? That’s simply to build a contradiction: APE sees everything, and there’s something APE doesn’t see. But if the all-perceiving entity is assumed not to be a real thing, the problem goes away.