Good answer. So, if I’ve understood you, you’re saying that we can recognize meaningless statements as items of language (and as distinct from one another even) because they consist of words that are elsewhere and in different contexts meaningful.
So for example I may have a function ”...is green.” where we can fill this in with true objects “the tree”, false objects “the sky” and objects with render the resulting sentence meaningless, like “three”. The function can be meaningfully filled out, and ‘three’ can be the objet of a meaningful sentence (‘three is greater than two’) but in this connection the resulting sentence is meaningless.
OTOH, there is no reason to go along with the idea that denotion (or empirical consequence) is essential
to meaning. You could instead use you realisation that you actually can tell the difference between
untestable statements to conclude that they are in fact meaningful, whatever warmed-over Logical Positivism may say.
You do know the meaning. Knowing the meaning is what tells you there is no denotation. You know there is no King of France because you know what “King” and “France” mean.
Good answer. So, if I’ve understood you, you’re saying that we can recognize meaningless statements as items of language (and as distinct from one another even) because they consist of words that are elsewhere and in different contexts meaningful.
So for example I may have a function ”...is green.” where we can fill this in with true objects “the tree”, false objects “the sky” and objects with render the resulting sentence meaningless, like “three”. The function can be meaningfully filled out, and ‘three’ can be the objet of a meaningful sentence (‘three is greater than two’) but in this connection the resulting sentence is meaningless.
Does that sound right to you?
OTOH, there is no reason to go along with the idea that denotion (or empirical consequence) is essential to meaning. You could instead use you realisation that you actually can tell the difference between untestable statements to conclude that they are in fact meaningful, whatever warmed-over Logical Positivism may say.
It’s not useful to know they are meaningful if you don’t know the meaning.
You do know the meaning. Knowing the meaning is what tells you there is no denotation. You know there is no King of France because you know what “King” and “France” mean.
I wouldn’t agree with this. Knowing whether or not something is meaningful is potentially quite a lot of information.