It’s vogue to defend correspondence because 1) it sounds like common sense and 2) it signals rejection of largely discredited instrumentalism. But surely a correspondence theorist should have a theory of the nature of the correspondence. How does a proposition or a verbal string correspond to a state of reality? By virtue of what is it a correct description? We can state a metalinguistic relationship about “Snow is white,” but how does this locution hook onto the actual world?
Correspondence theorists think this is a task for a philosophical theory of reference. (Such as in an account where “torekp” refers to you by virtue of the “christening event” of your creating the account and causal connections therefrom.) Deflationists are apt to say it is ultimately a technical problem in the psychology of language.
Interesting. I am inclined to replicate my compatibility claim at this level too; i.e., the technical solution in the psychology of language will be a philosophical theory of reference (as much as one needs) as well. I’d be interested in references to any of the deflationist discussions of reference you have in mind.
It’s vogue to defend correspondence because 1) it sounds like common sense and 2) it signals rejection of largely discredited instrumentalism. But surely a correspondence theorist should have a theory of the nature of the correspondence. How does a proposition or a verbal string correspond to a state of reality? By virtue of what is it a correct description? We can state a metalinguistic relationship about “Snow is white,” but how does this locution hook onto the actual world?
Correspondence theorists think this is a task for a philosophical theory of reference. (Such as in an account where “torekp” refers to you by virtue of the “christening event” of your creating the account and causal connections therefrom.) Deflationists are apt to say it is ultimately a technical problem in the psychology of language.
Interesting. I am inclined to replicate my compatibility claim at this level too; i.e., the technical solution in the psychology of language will be a philosophical theory of reference (as much as one needs) as well. I’d be interested in references to any of the deflationist discussions of reference you have in mind.