That’s an attempt to dismiss epistemic rationality by arguing that only instrumental rationality matters.
I suppose that’s true by certain definitions of “matters”, but it ignores those of us who do assign some utility to understanding the universe itself, and therefore at least partially incorporate the epistemic in the instrumental.…
Also, if I die tomorrow of a heart attack, I think it’s still meaningful to say that the rest of the planet will still exist afterwards, even though there won’t exist any experimental prediction I can make and personally verify to that effect. I find solipsism rather uninteresting.
That’s an attempt to dismiss epistemic rationality by arguing that only instrumental rationality matters.
No. Please note that the terminology here is overloaded, hence it can cause confusion.
Instrumentalism, in the contex of epistemology, does not refer to instrumental rationality. It is the position that concepts are meaningful only up to the extent that they are useful to explain and predict experiences.
In the instrumentalist framework, you start with an input of sensorial experiences and possibly an output of actions (you may even consider your long-term memories as a type of sensorial experiences). You notice that your experiences show some regularities: they are correlated with each others and with your actions. Thus, put forward, test, and falsify hypotheses in order to build a model that explains these regularities and helps you to predict your next experience.
In this framework, the notion that there are entities external to yourself is just a scientific hypothesis, not an assumption.
Epistemological realism, on the other hand, assumes a priori that there are external entities which cause your experiences, they are called “Reality” or “the Truth” or “Nature” or “the Territory”.
Believing that abstract concepts, such as mathematical axioms and theorems, are also external entities, is called Platonism. That’s for instance, the position of Roger Penrose and, IIUC, Eliezer Yudkowsky.
The distinction between assuming a priori that there is an external world and merely hypothesizing it may appear of little importance, and indeed for most part it is possible to do science in both frameworks. However, the difference shows up in intricate issues which are far removed from intuition, such as the interpretaion of quantum mechanics:
Does the wavefunction exist?
For an instrumentalist, the wavefunction exists in the same sense that the ground beneath their feet exists: they are both hypothesis useful to predict sensorial experiences.
For a realist, instead, it makes sense to ponder whether the wavefunction is just in the map or also in the territory.
Epistemic rationality is a subset of instrumental rationality, to the extent that you value the truth.
Compartmentalization protects us from seeing reality for what it really is: defined only up to the instrumental theories which trouble themselves with certain otherwise insignificant portions of it.
That’s an attempt to dismiss epistemic rationality by arguing that only instrumental rationality matters.
No, that’s the statement that epistemic rationality is based on instrumental rationality.
Also, if I die tomorrow of a heart attack, I think it’s still meaningful to say that the rest of the planet will still exist afterwards, even though there won’t exist any experimental prediction I can make and personally verify to that effect.
Indeed, no good model predicts that a death of one individual result in the cessation of all experiences for everyone else. Not sure what strawman you are fighting here.
Indeed, no good model predicts that a death of one individual result in the cessation of all experiences for everyone else. Not sure what strawman you are fighting here.
Okay, then I’ve probably misunderstood what definition you meant to give to “exist”. The comment you linked talked about reliably predicting future experiences, and I’ll reliably not be experiencing a universe after my death—so doesn’t that mean that the universe won’t exist if I shared your definition of “exist”?
That conclusion also seemed to me to follow from your complaint about EY’s definition involving photons that keep on existing after we no longer get to experience them.
Anyway, whatever confusion I have about the meaning you attempted to communicate, it was an honest one.
The comment you linked talked about reliably predicting future experiences, and I’ll reliably not be experiencing a universe after my death—so doesn’t that mean that the universe won’t exist if I shared your definition of “exist”?
I don’t see why. A half-decent model would not center on a single person, and the definition given does not say that “future experiences” are those of a specific person. Unless, of course, the model in question strives to describe this person’s sensory experience, in which case, yes, you likely stop sensing the universe after you are gone.
That’s an attempt to dismiss epistemic rationality by arguing that only instrumental rationality matters.
I suppose that’s true by certain definitions of “matters”, but it ignores those of us who do assign some utility to understanding the universe itself, and therefore at least partially incorporate the epistemic in the instrumental.…
Also, if I die tomorrow of a heart attack, I think it’s still meaningful to say that the rest of the planet will still exist afterwards, even though there won’t exist any experimental prediction I can make and personally verify to that effect. I find solipsism rather uninteresting.
No. Please note that the terminology here is overloaded, hence it can cause confusion.
Instrumentalism, in the contex of epistemology, does not refer to instrumental rationality. It is the position that concepts are meaningful only up to the extent that they are useful to explain and predict experiences.
In the instrumentalist framework, you start with an input of sensorial experiences and possibly an output of actions (you may even consider your long-term memories as a type of sensorial experiences). You notice that your experiences show some regularities: they are correlated with each others and with your actions. Thus, put forward, test, and falsify hypotheses in order to build a model that explains these regularities and helps you to predict your next experience.
In this framework, the notion that there are entities external to yourself is just a scientific hypothesis, not an assumption.
Epistemological realism, on the other hand, assumes a priori that there are external entities which cause your experiences, they are called “Reality” or “the Truth” or “Nature” or “the Territory”.
Believing that abstract concepts, such as mathematical axioms and theorems, are also external entities, is called Platonism. That’s for instance, the position of Roger Penrose and, IIUC, Eliezer Yudkowsky.
The distinction between assuming a priori that there is an external world and merely hypothesizing it may appear of little importance, and indeed for most part it is possible to do science in both frameworks. However, the difference shows up in intricate issues which are far removed from intuition, such as the interpretaion of quantum mechanics:
Does the wavefunction exist? For an instrumentalist, the wavefunction exists in the same sense that the ground beneath their feet exists: they are both hypothesis useful to predict sensorial experiences. For a realist, instead, it makes sense to ponder whether the wavefunction is just in the map or also in the territory.
Epistemic rationality is a subset of instrumental rationality, to the extent that you value the truth.
-- Sark
(this allows the universe to keep existing after I die).
No, that’s the statement that epistemic rationality is based on instrumental rationality.
Indeed, no good model predicts that a death of one individual result in the cessation of all experiences for everyone else. Not sure what strawman you are fighting here.
Except as a psychological phenomenon, maybe.
Okay, then I’ve probably misunderstood what definition you meant to give to “exist”. The comment you linked talked about reliably predicting future experiences, and I’ll reliably not be experiencing a universe after my death—so doesn’t that mean that the universe won’t exist if I shared your definition of “exist”?
That conclusion also seemed to me to follow from your complaint about EY’s definition involving photons that keep on existing after we no longer get to experience them.
Anyway, whatever confusion I have about the meaning you attempted to communicate, it was an honest one.
I don’t see why. A half-decent model would not center on a single person, and the definition given does not say that “future experiences” are those of a specific person. Unless, of course, the model in question strives to describe this person’s sensory experience, in which case, yes, you likely stop sensing the universe after you are gone.