The ladder of abstraction goes up as well as down.
We spend a lot of time trying to descend it, being more specific (especially if we’re Paul Graham), but at times its better to be more abstract! Canonical example: Newton. The apple falling from the tree, and the Earth orbiting the sun, are specific examples, but the genius is identifying that the same forces are manipulating them on vastly different scales. (It’s also vital not to get stuck believing that the apple is flat, but that’s not important right now).
Dan Dennett has the idea of “greedy reductionism”. Dennett claims, more or less, that people have souls but the souls are made of tiny robots, ie. “neurons” and “souls” are both legitimate concepts. “Souls are JUST tiny robots and don’t really exist” he calls greedy reductionism: proverbially, not seeing the forest for the trees.
Trying to argue better, as in “ladder of inference” or double crux, is very likely to involve moving up and down the ladder of abstraction, between general concepts and specific observations.
Another example of going up/down the ladder/lattice of abstraction, is also given by Paul Graham. In his essay “General and Surprising”, he noted how valuable insights are generally-applicable, usually meaning abstract. However, he noted that it’s often more attainable to say something more specific about already-known-to-be-important-things (as long as that more specific thing is new).
More specifically, being specific seems like it would catch more mistakes/laziness/haziness in reasoning. In contrast, being more general seems better for having new ideas, rather than getting them to specifically match reality well.
The ladder of abstraction goes up as well as down.
We spend a lot of time trying to descend it, being more specific (especially if we’re Paul Graham), but at times its better to be more abstract! Canonical example: Newton. The apple falling from the tree, and the Earth orbiting the sun, are specific examples, but the genius is identifying that the same forces are manipulating them on vastly different scales. (It’s also vital not to get stuck believing that the apple is flat, but that’s not important right now).
Dan Dennett has the idea of “greedy reductionism”. Dennett claims, more or less, that people have souls but the souls are made of tiny robots, ie. “neurons” and “souls” are both legitimate concepts. “Souls are JUST tiny robots and don’t really exist” he calls greedy reductionism: proverbially, not seeing the forest for the trees.
Trying to argue better, as in “ladder of inference” or double crux, is very likely to involve moving up and down the ladder of abstraction, between general concepts and specific observations.
Another example of going up/down the ladder/lattice of abstraction, is also given by Paul Graham. In his essay “General and Surprising”, he noted how valuable insights are generally-applicable, usually meaning abstract. However, he noted that it’s often more attainable to say something more specific about already-known-to-be-important-things (as long as that more specific thing is new).
More specifically, being specific seems like it would catch more mistakes/laziness/haziness in reasoning. In contrast, being more general seems better for having new ideas, rather than getting them to specifically match reality well.