Subjective perceptions and the relations between humans are also part of reality.
Of course.
A more charitable phrasing: you view feminism as more concerned with instrumental rationality than with epistemic rationality.
I don’t think this is correct, though. My experience has been that in discussions with feminists who critique rationality (FWCR for short),* we have deep disagreements not on the importance of epistemology, but the process and goal of epistemology. If something is correct but hurtful, for example, I might call it true because it is correct while a FWCR would call it false because it is hurtful. (One can find ample examples of this in the arguments for egalitarianism in measurement of socially relevant variables.)
One could argue that they’re making the instrumentally rational decision to spread a lie in order to accomplish some goal, or that it’s instrumentally rational to engage in coalition politics which involves truth-bending, but this isn’t a patrissimo saying “you guys should go out an accomplish things,” but a “truth wasn’t important anyway.”
*I am trying to avoid painting feminism with a broad brush, as not all feminists critique rationality, and it is the anti-rationals in particular on which I want to focus.
I’ve never seen this sort of claim, and thought you were talking about, for example, discouraging research on sex differences because people are likely to overinterpret the observations and cause harm as a result. Can you link to an example of the sort of argument you are discussing?
thought you were talking about, for example, discouraging research on sex differences because people are likely to overinterpret the observations and cause harm as a result.
I did have this sort of thing in mind. My claim was that I think it also goes deeper. This article (PM me your email address if you don’t have access to the PDF) splits the criticism into three primary schools, the first of which begins with the content of scientific theories (i.e. racism, sexism, class bias) and from that concludes that rationality is wrong. An excerpt:
If logic, rationality and objectivity produce such theories, then logic, rationality and objectivity must be at fault and women must search for alternative ways of knowing nature. Such arguments often end up privileging subjectivity, intuition, or a feminine way of knowing characterized by interaction with or identification with, rather than distance from, the object of knowledge.
If I’m reading that paragraph right, that’s attributed to Luce Irigaray’s 1987 paper.
The second school criticizes the methodology and philosophy of science, and then the third criticizes the funding sources (and the implied methodology) of modern science. The author argues that each has serious weaknesses, and that we need to build a better science to incorporate the critiques (with a handful of practical suggestions along those lines) but that the fundamental project of science as a communal endeavor is sound. Since I think the author of that paper is close to my camp, it may be prudent to follow her references and ensure her interpretation of them is fair.
Of course.
I don’t think this is correct, though. My experience has been that in discussions with feminists who critique rationality (FWCR for short),* we have deep disagreements not on the importance of epistemology, but the process and goal of epistemology. If something is correct but hurtful, for example, I might call it true because it is correct while a FWCR would call it false because it is hurtful. (One can find ample examples of this in the arguments for egalitarianism in measurement of socially relevant variables.)
One could argue that they’re making the instrumentally rational decision to spread a lie in order to accomplish some goal, or that it’s instrumentally rational to engage in coalition politics which involves truth-bending, but this isn’t a patrissimo saying “you guys should go out an accomplish things,” but a “truth wasn’t important anyway.”
*I am trying to avoid painting feminism with a broad brush, as not all feminists critique rationality, and it is the anti-rationals in particular on which I want to focus.
I’ve never seen this sort of claim, and thought you were talking about, for example, discouraging research on sex differences because people are likely to overinterpret the observations and cause harm as a result. Can you link to an example of the sort of argument you are discussing?
I did have this sort of thing in mind. My claim was that I think it also goes deeper. This article (PM me your email address if you don’t have access to the PDF) splits the criticism into three primary schools, the first of which begins with the content of scientific theories (i.e. racism, sexism, class bias) and from that concludes that rationality is wrong. An excerpt:
If I’m reading that paragraph right, that’s attributed to Luce Irigaray’s 1987 paper.
The second school criticizes the methodology and philosophy of science, and then the third criticizes the funding sources (and the implied methodology) of modern science. The author argues that each has serious weaknesses, and that we need to build a better science to incorporate the critiques (with a handful of practical suggestions along those lines) but that the fundamental project of science as a communal endeavor is sound. Since I think the author of that paper is close to my camp, it may be prudent to follow her references and ensure her interpretation of them is fair.