It seems like any cultural prospiracy to increase standards to exceptional levels, which I see as a good thing, would be quickly branded as ‘toxic’ by this outlook. It is a matter of contextual objection-solving whether or not large parts of you can be worse than a [desirably [normatively basic]] standard. If it is toxic, then it is not obvious to me that toxicity is bad, and if toxicity must be bad, then it is not clear to me that you can, in fair order, sneak in that connotation by characterizing rationalist self-standards as toxic.
The OP provides examples to illustrate what they mean by an overly extreme standard. They also say that many EA/rationalist principles are good, and that there’s less toxicity in these communities than in others.
Might be good to taboo “toxicity.” My definition is “behavior in the name of a worthy goal that doesn’t really deliver that goal, but makes the inflictor of the toxicity feel better or get a selfish benefit in the short run, while causing problems and bad feelings for others.”
For example, a trainer berating trainees in the name of high standards after a failure, in an attempt to punish them into working harder, or in order to make the trainees into the objects of blame by the trainer’s superiors and not the trainer.
Or a person beating themselves up over a $5 purchase for themselves in the name of charity, only to burn out on EA entirely after a few years. This isn’t obviously toxic, by the definition above, except through some sort of internal family systems framework in which one part of themselves is getting off on the mental beratement, while another part suffers. Seems linked to Eliezer’s idea of “hammering down on one part of yourself” from his most recent post here.
This critique seems to rely on a misreading of the post. The author isn’t saying the rationality community has exceptionally toxic social norms.
I’m not mentioning these communities because I think they’re extra toxic or anything, by the way. They’re probably less toxic than the average group, and a lot of their principles are great.
Rather that goals, even worthy goals, can result in certain toxic social dynamics that no one would endorse explicitly:
Sometimes—often—these forbidden thoughts/actions aren’t even contrary to the explicit values. They just don’t fit in with the implied group aesthetic, which is often a much stricter, more menacing guideline, all the more so because it’s a collective unwritten fiction.
There’s a bit of an aesthetic parallel to ai alignment. It would be surprising if the poorly understood process that produces social dynamics just so happened to be healthy for everyone involved in the case of the rationality project. Verbalizing some of the implicit beliefs gives people the ability to reflect on which ones they want to keep.
I would expect the author to agree that most (all?) communities contain toxic dynamics.
It seems like any cultural prospiracy to increase standards to exceptional levels, which I see as a good thing, would be quickly branded as ‘toxic’ by this outlook.
I read it not as saying that having high standards would be bad by itself, but that the toxicity is about a specific dynamic where the standards become interpreted as disallowing even things that have nothing to do with the standards themselves. E.g. nothing about having high standards for rationality requires one to look down on art.
You make good points. Toxicity is relative to some standard. A set of social norms that are considered toxic from the perspective of, say, a postmodern studies department (where absolute non-offensiveness is prime), might be perfectly healthy from the perspective of a physics research department (where objectivity is prime). It’s important to ask, “Toxic according to who, and with respect to what?”
Emile Durkheim asked his readers to imagine what would happen in a “society of saints.” There would still be sinners because “faults which appear venial to the layman” would there create scandal.
It seems like any cultural prospiracy to increase standards to exceptional levels, which I see as a good thing, would be quickly branded as ‘toxic’ by this outlook. It is a matter of contextual objection-solving whether or not large parts of you can be worse than a [desirably [normatively basic]] standard. If it is toxic, then it is not obvious to me that toxicity is bad, and if toxicity must be bad, then it is not clear to me that you can, in fair order, sneak in that connotation by characterizing rationalist self-standards as toxic.
The OP provides examples to illustrate what they mean by an overly extreme standard. They also say that many EA/rationalist principles are good, and that there’s less toxicity in these communities than in others.
Might be good to taboo “toxicity.” My definition is “behavior in the name of a worthy goal that doesn’t really deliver that goal, but makes the inflictor of the toxicity feel better or get a selfish benefit in the short run, while causing problems and bad feelings for others.”
For example, a trainer berating trainees in the name of high standards after a failure, in an attempt to punish them into working harder, or in order to make the trainees into the objects of blame by the trainer’s superiors and not the trainer.
Or a person beating themselves up over a $5 purchase for themselves in the name of charity, only to burn out on EA entirely after a few years. This isn’t obviously toxic, by the definition above, except through some sort of internal family systems framework in which one part of themselves is getting off on the mental beratement, while another part suffers. Seems linked to Eliezer’s idea of “hammering down on one part of yourself” from his most recent post here.
This critique seems to rely on a misreading of the post. The author isn’t saying the rationality community has exceptionally toxic social norms.
Rather that goals, even worthy goals, can result in certain toxic social dynamics that no one would endorse explicitly:
There’s a bit of an aesthetic parallel to ai alignment. It would be surprising if the poorly understood process that produces social dynamics just so happened to be healthy for everyone involved in the case of the rationality project. Verbalizing some of the implicit beliefs gives people the ability to reflect on which ones they want to keep.
I would expect the author to agree that most (all?) communities contain toxic dynamics.
I read it not as saying that having high standards would be bad by itself, but that the toxicity is about a specific dynamic where the standards become interpreted as disallowing even things that have nothing to do with the standards themselves. E.g. nothing about having high standards for rationality requires one to look down on art.
You make good points. Toxicity is relative to some standard. A set of social norms that are considered toxic from the perspective of, say, a postmodern studies department (where absolute non-offensiveness is prime), might be perfectly healthy from the perspective of a physics research department (where objectivity is prime). It’s important to ask, “Toxic according to who, and with respect to what?”
Emile Durkheim asked his readers to imagine what would happen in a “society of saints.” There would still be sinners because “faults which appear venial to the layman” would there create scandal.