However, if we can’t trust our belief-forming faculties to tell us the truth about God, why should we trust them to tell us the truth about anything, including evolutionary science? If our cognitive faculties only tell us what we need to survive, not what is true, why trust them about anything at all?
Rewrite the paragraph; but remove all unnecessary particulars and emotive words, leaving the propositions in the abstract:
… if we can’t trust our beliefs … to tell us the truth … why should we trust them to tell us the truth …?
… If our cognitive faculties … only tell us what we need to survive … not what is true … why trust them?
The first proposition reduces to an entirely meaningless tautology. The second proposition implies that truth is something other than what we need to survive. Together, the propositions ask the question: In what contexts can we trust our beliefs?
These abstract forms of the propositions, expose the issues under discussion: What is belief? To what extent can we trust our beliefs? These issues have been the subject of much discourse and quite a number of wars, genocides, and such like; over the past few thousand years. Although there appears to be no convincing philosophical argument either way, historical and palaeontological evidence suggests that species and cultures unable to adapt, do not survive. In the human cultural context, these issues have been explored by Jared Diamond.
The evolutionary source of empathy appears to be our mirror neurons, you may follow the research from the work of V.S.Ramachandran, outlined here, and from this video.
The evolutionary advantage of mirror neurons, appears to result from the human trait toward scavenging. When following another creature to its source of food, we must imitate the other creature, whilst at the same time distinguishing ourselves from the other creature; in order to know the difference between ‘something has eaten’, and ‘I have eaten’.
Here are a few pointers to philosophical arguments that might expose fallacies in thinking.
Beliefs may be classified into two types:
a belief that can be externally verified by experiment (science)
a belief that can not be externally verified by experiment (faith.)
The former type, are those beliefs that I must have; for example, if I do not believe the doorway is where it is (my map does not correspond to the territory), I will likely walk into the wall. These types of beliefs are necessary for my survival.
The latter type, are those beliefs that I choose to have; these beliefs express my preferences and values; for example, if I prefer to eat chicken than pork, and am offered an option, I will value a bowl of chicken more than a bowl of pork.
Preferences are contextual: if I am offered no choice, and have the option of eating pork or starving; then my preference for chicken may compromise my survival. If my preference for chicken prevents me from eating pork, and I subsequently die; my unshakeable preference for chicken will die with me.
I consider that the above illustrates that only the former type of belief will survive in the long run; which answers the question by inference.
Provided that one person feels that their preferences were freely chosen; then, what justification is there for denying another similar freedoms? If someone asks: Do you believe in God? - answer: Do you believe in a god? If their answer is in the affirmative, one can then answer in honesty: I believe that you believe in a god? This becomes a little tricky if someone asks: Do you believe there is only one God? Then one must find at least two people to respond in the affirmative, before one can answer in honesty: No (the burden of proof falls to them, if they wish to claim that these are one and the same god.)
For those of a more philosophical temperament, this paradox sometimes suffices (or failing that, invokes a perplexed expression):
For some ‘thing’ to exist; that ‘thing’ must first be recognized
(there can never, therefore, be only one instance of any ‘thing’.)
This works for any ideal (universal), but can be applied to the concept of ‘god’, as easily as the concept of ‘chair’ or ‘unicorn’. It makes no sense to ask: Do you believe in the existence of ‘chair’? For the question to have sense, one must ask in the particular; Do you believe in the existence of ‘that chair’?
These are all plays on words, and I for one, have never really understood the difference: a ‘believer’ claims to believe in one ‘unicorn’, and a ‘non believer’ claims to not believe in another ‘unicorn’. This confuses me; if pressed, I prefer to label myself ‘apatheist’, I really do not see that this kind of belief makes any difference either way:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apatheism
Rewrite the paragraph; but remove all unnecessary particulars and emotive words, leaving the propositions in the abstract:
The first proposition reduces to an entirely meaningless tautology. The second proposition implies that truth is something other than what we need to survive. Together, the propositions ask the question: In what contexts can we trust our beliefs?
These abstract forms of the propositions, expose the issues under discussion: What is belief? To what extent can we trust our beliefs? These issues have been the subject of much discourse and quite a number of wars, genocides, and such like; over the past few thousand years. Although there appears to be no convincing philosophical argument either way, historical and palaeontological evidence suggests that species and cultures unable to adapt, do not survive. In the human cultural context, these issues have been explored by Jared Diamond.
The evolutionary source of empathy appears to be our mirror neurons, you may follow the research from the work of V.S.Ramachandran, outlined here, and from this video.
The evolutionary advantage of mirror neurons, appears to result from the human trait toward scavenging. When following another creature to its source of food, we must imitate the other creature, whilst at the same time distinguishing ourselves from the other creature; in order to know the difference between ‘something has eaten’, and ‘I have eaten’.
Here are a few pointers to philosophical arguments that might expose fallacies in thinking.
Beliefs may be classified into two types:
a belief that can be externally verified by experiment (science)
a belief that can not be externally verified by experiment (faith.)
The former type, are those beliefs that I must have; for example, if I do not believe the doorway is where it is (my map does not correspond to the territory), I will likely walk into the wall. These types of beliefs are necessary for my survival.
The latter type, are those beliefs that I choose to have; these beliefs express my preferences and values; for example, if I prefer to eat chicken than pork, and am offered an option, I will value a bowl of chicken more than a bowl of pork.
Preferences are contextual: if I am offered no choice, and have the option of eating pork or starving; then my preference for chicken may compromise my survival. If my preference for chicken prevents me from eating pork, and I subsequently die; my unshakeable preference for chicken will die with me.
I consider that the above illustrates that only the former type of belief will survive in the long run; which answers the question by inference.
Provided that one person feels that their preferences were freely chosen; then, what justification is there for denying another similar freedoms? If someone asks: Do you believe in God? - answer: Do you believe in a god? If their answer is in the affirmative, one can then answer in honesty: I believe that you believe in a god? This becomes a little tricky if someone asks: Do you believe there is only one God? Then one must find at least two people to respond in the affirmative, before one can answer in honesty: No (the burden of proof falls to them, if they wish to claim that these are one and the same god.)
For those of a more philosophical temperament, this paradox sometimes suffices (or failing that, invokes a perplexed expression):
This works for any ideal (universal), but can be applied to the concept of ‘god’, as easily as the concept of ‘chair’ or ‘unicorn’. It makes no sense to ask: Do you believe in the existence of ‘chair’? For the question to have sense, one must ask in the particular; Do you believe in the existence of ‘that chair’?
These are all plays on words, and I for one, have never really understood the difference: a ‘believer’ claims to believe in one ‘unicorn’, and a ‘non believer’ claims to not believe in another ‘unicorn’. This confuses me; if pressed, I prefer to label myself ‘apatheist’, I really do not see that this kind of belief makes any difference either way: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apatheism