I was under the impression the Chinese room was an argument against intelligence simulation, not consciousness. I think you’re right actually. Will edit.
This seems like pretty much Professor John Searle’s argument, to me. Your argument about the algorithm being subject to interpretation and observer dependent has been made by Searle who refers to it as “universal realizability”.
See;
Searle, J. R., 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. London: Granta Books. Chapter 1, pp.14-17. (Originally Published: 1997. New York: The New York Review of Books. Also published by Granta Books in 1997.)
Searle, J. R., 2002. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 9th Edition. Chapter 9, pp.207-212. (Originally Published: 1992. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.)
Why do you cite Chalmers for fading qualia, but not Searle for the rephrased Chinese Room?
I was under the impression the Chinese room was an argument against intelligence simulation, not consciousness. I think you’re right actually. Will edit.
This seems like pretty much Professor John Searle’s argument, to me. Your argument about the algorithm being subject to interpretation and observer dependent has been made by Searle who refers to it as “universal realizability”.
See;
Searle, J. R., 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. London: Granta Books. Chapter 1, pp.14-17. (Originally Published: 1997. New York: The New York Review of Books. Also published by Granta Books in 1997.)
Searle, J. R., 2002. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 9th Edition. Chapter 9, pp.207-212. (Originally Published: 1992. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.)