I’m not convinced that when you look at the whole set of minds doing dovetailing simulations and put probability distributions on how far they go, your algorithm and Eliezer’s give different results. Actually calculating it out looks a bit tough; my intuition is based on the fact that a simulator doing N computations gives program n of the order of Sqrt(N) computations using either algorithm, provided that n << N.
Well, since any finite number is smaller than infinity, for ANY program, once it starts running, it would get just as many steps per, well, step, as any other program (in the original version). ie, consider two programs A and B such that A came earlier. In the original scheduler, once B started up, for each tick A gets, B would also get one tick. But A would also have an initial bunch of ticks that it got before B even started.
My version makes sure that B gets those extra ticks too, that’s all. I, personally, don’t think it would change the probability distributions that would be experienced from the inside, given that the base computation really is run with unbounded resources and so on and so forth.
Ah, I was thinking more of a huge (infinite?) set of simulators, each running for some finite number of ticks. Then the subjective probability of being in program number n is related to the proportion of simulators that run program n for long enough to reach a feasible world for you to be in. So, sure, program A gets more ticks than B in the original scheduler, but I think the determining factor is how many simulators go on to run B at all.
Ooooooh. No, I guess the model we’re using here (that is, the fanfic in question) is that somewhere down the levels there is a single simulator running a “program of all possible programs”.
Although, I wonder if we can then just say the bottom level is Tegmark’s Level 4 Multiverse and get rid of any actual machine or such at the lowest level. :)
Although, I wonder if we can then just say the bottom level is Tegmark’s Level 4 Multiverse and get rid of any actual machine or such at the lowest level. :)
Tegmark’s Level 4 doesn’t answer the question of how much weight each experience has. It’s a similar problem to asking where do the Born probabilities come from.
Well, it doesn’t seem to me that it’d be any more confusing than “turing machine running the program of all programs” as far as difficulty of reasoning about weights.
I’m not convinced that when you look at the whole set of minds doing dovetailing simulations and put probability distributions on how far they go, your algorithm and Eliezer’s give different results. Actually calculating it out looks a bit tough; my intuition is based on the fact that a simulator doing N computations gives program n of the order of Sqrt(N) computations using either algorithm, provided that n << N.
Well, since any finite number is smaller than infinity, for ANY program, once it starts running, it would get just as many steps per, well, step, as any other program (in the original version). ie, consider two programs A and B such that A came earlier. In the original scheduler, once B started up, for each tick A gets, B would also get one tick. But A would also have an initial bunch of ticks that it got before B even started.
My version makes sure that B gets those extra ticks too, that’s all. I, personally, don’t think it would change the probability distributions that would be experienced from the inside, given that the base computation really is run with unbounded resources and so on and so forth.
Ah, I was thinking more of a huge (infinite?) set of simulators, each running for some finite number of ticks. Then the subjective probability of being in program number n is related to the proportion of simulators that run program n for long enough to reach a feasible world for you to be in. So, sure, program A gets more ticks than B in the original scheduler, but I think the determining factor is how many simulators go on to run B at all.
Ooooooh. No, I guess the model we’re using here (that is, the fanfic in question) is that somewhere down the levels there is a single simulator running a “program of all possible programs”.
Although, I wonder if we can then just say the bottom level is Tegmark’s Level 4 Multiverse and get rid of any actual machine or such at the lowest level. :)
Tegmark’s Level 4 doesn’t answer the question of how much weight each experience has. It’s a similar problem to asking where do the Born probabilities come from.
Well, it doesn’t seem to me that it’d be any more confusing than “turing machine running the program of all programs” as far as difficulty of reasoning about weights.