Nothing is more unjust, however common, than to charge with hypocrisy him that expresses zeal for those virtues which he neglects to practice; since he may be sincerely convinced of the advantages of conquering his passions, without having yet obtained the victory, as a man may be confident of the advantages of a voyage, or a journey..., without having courage or industry to undertake it, and may honestly recommend to others, those attempts which he neglects himself.
Is Samuel Johnson’s quote a valid or true statement? I understand your central thrust—the inability to do something personally (such as control one’s sexual urges) and the disposition to encourage others to overcome that inability are not necessarily contradictory—indeed, they may fall together naturally.
However, in Samuel Johnson’s world, and the world in which this “issue” comes up the most, politics, we might imagine that there exist two types of people: sociopathic individuals hungry for power, and individuals who are sincere.
If sociopathic individuals hungry for power are more often hypocrites, then we might, as an efficient rule of thumb (not being able to distinguish the two save through their observable actions!) condemn hypocrites because they are likely to be power-hungry individuals.
As a bayesian update, in the world of politics, we expect that hypocrites are more likely to be power hungry or sociopathic. I see Samuel Johnson’s quote as potentially true, but ignoring a world of imperfect information and signaling.
Fair enough. Maybe it is typically reasonable to charge people with hypocrisy when they neglect to follow their professed ethical codes.
I still like the quote, even if it is hyperbolic. It is useful to be reminded that there are important cases where failure to live up to one’s professed code does not warrant this kind of criticism. Being overly concerned with hypocrisy can make you be unconcerned with living up to a meaningful ethical code. This is especially important in the context of consequentialist morality. This is just a hunch, but I think there are a fair number of intelligent people who shy away from a demanding code for fear of being charged with hypocrisy. But there need be no genuine hypocrisy, at least in any deeply regrettable sense, in professing a demanding ethical code and failing to live up to it. Better to try to live up to a demanding code and fail than meet the demands of an uninspiring and mundane one. (In this kind of case, of course, you aren’t just professing the code to curry political favor.)
as a man may be confident of the advantages of a voyage, or a journey..., without having courage or industry to undertake it
This seems at odds with our notion of subjective probability, where we assume that significant lingering doubt after confidently assigning a 99%+ probability is evidence that your calibration is poor, and your estimate should have been lower.
Does the man really believe the voyage is, all things considered, a good one?
I’m not sure I understand what you mean when you say
This seems at odds with our notion of subjective probability, where we assume that significant lingering doubt after confidently assigning a 99%+ probability is evidence that your calibration is poor, and your estimate should have been lower.
The most confusing part about this is the part about poor calibration.
As for the rest, I don’t deny that the fact that the man is unwilling to undertake the voyage is evidence that he doesn’t think it is worthwhile, at least in ordinary contexts. But I think there is little to recommend the view that acting against your best reflective judgment is impossible or even extremely rare.
--Samuel Johnson
Is Samuel Johnson’s quote a valid or true statement? I understand your central thrust—the inability to do something personally (such as control one’s sexual urges) and the disposition to encourage others to overcome that inability are not necessarily contradictory—indeed, they may fall together naturally.
However, in Samuel Johnson’s world, and the world in which this “issue” comes up the most, politics, we might imagine that there exist two types of people: sociopathic individuals hungry for power, and individuals who are sincere.
If sociopathic individuals hungry for power are more often hypocrites, then we might, as an efficient rule of thumb (not being able to distinguish the two save through their observable actions!) condemn hypocrites because they are likely to be power-hungry individuals.
As a bayesian update, in the world of politics, we expect that hypocrites are more likely to be power hungry or sociopathic. I see Samuel Johnson’s quote as potentially true, but ignoring a world of imperfect information and signaling.
Fair enough. Maybe it is typically reasonable to charge people with hypocrisy when they neglect to follow their professed ethical codes.
I still like the quote, even if it is hyperbolic. It is useful to be reminded that there are important cases where failure to live up to one’s professed code does not warrant this kind of criticism. Being overly concerned with hypocrisy can make you be unconcerned with living up to a meaningful ethical code. This is especially important in the context of consequentialist morality. This is just a hunch, but I think there are a fair number of intelligent people who shy away from a demanding code for fear of being charged with hypocrisy. But there need be no genuine hypocrisy, at least in any deeply regrettable sense, in professing a demanding ethical code and failing to live up to it. Better to try to live up to a demanding code and fail than meet the demands of an uninspiring and mundane one. (In this kind of case, of course, you aren’t just professing the code to curry political favor.)
This seems at odds with our notion of subjective probability, where we assume that significant lingering doubt after confidently assigning a 99%+ probability is evidence that your calibration is poor, and your estimate should have been lower.
Does the man really believe the voyage is, all things considered, a good one?
I’m not sure I understand what you mean when you say
The most confusing part about this is the part about poor calibration.
As for the rest, I don’t deny that the fact that the man is unwilling to undertake the voyage is evidence that he doesn’t think it is worthwhile, at least in ordinary contexts. But I think there is little to recommend the view that acting against your best reflective judgment is impossible or even extremely rare.