When scientists debated the real existence of atoms, they were debating exactly that: whether atoms are real. Why must there be something to “unpack” here? [They certainly were not disagreeing about how to apply the reality concept.] The concept of “real,” the distinction between real and imaginary, is as basic as it gets. Does it seem to you there must be something more primitive? If so, you haven’t said why. Some philosophers, called “anti-realists,” contend that reality can be cashed out in terms of concepts more fundamental, but none have succeeded in overcoming the basic objection: something can be real and be contrary to our best theories; what our best theories posit isn’t necessarily real. Therefore, reality can’t be analyzed further in terms of conformity to or usability in our theories (which is what most posters are trying to do). You intuit—when you report confusion—the failure of not only the current theories but any reductionist theory of the “real.” What’s really “out there” doesn’t depend on what we think about it!
Why would you think the “real” can be “unpacked”? Your premise asserts the universal existence of hidden meamings for words. Elizer defended the strange idea that words inherently elude the assignment of a new, arbitrary meaning. There’s supposedly some connection between a word and what it represents that becomes fixed once assigned. The first commenter, Caledonian2, confuted Elizer’s position by distinguishing between factors that can interfere with the correct application of a definition and those fixing the definition itself. Elizer’s claim that affective factors and the like constrain the meaning of a term was based on evidence showing that extraneous factors may undermine the correct use of the term; the point being that you can substitute concepts if you know how to control for the influence of these factors.
Your premise, that there’s “hidden meaning,” hasn’t been confirmed. As you realize, no one has “unpacked” “real.” It’s because your premise is false.
AnnaSalamon,
When scientists debated the real existence of atoms, they were debating exactly that: whether atoms are real. Why must there be something to “unpack” here? [They certainly were not disagreeing about how to apply the reality concept.] The concept of “real,” the distinction between real and imaginary, is as basic as it gets. Does it seem to you there must be something more primitive? If so, you haven’t said why. Some philosophers, called “anti-realists,” contend that reality can be cashed out in terms of concepts more fundamental, but none have succeeded in overcoming the basic objection: something can be real and be contrary to our best theories; what our best theories posit isn’t necessarily real. Therefore, reality can’t be analyzed further in terms of conformity to or usability in our theories (which is what most posters are trying to do). You intuit—when you report confusion—the failure of not only the current theories but any reductionist theory of the “real.” What’s really “out there” doesn’t depend on what we think about it!
Why would you think the “real” can be “unpacked”? Your premise asserts the universal existence of hidden meamings for words. Elizer defended the strange idea that words inherently elude the assignment of a new, arbitrary meaning. There’s supposedly some connection between a word and what it represents that becomes fixed once assigned. The first commenter, Caledonian2, confuted Elizer’s position by distinguishing between factors that can interfere with the correct application of a definition and those fixing the definition itself. Elizer’s claim that affective factors and the like constrain the meaning of a term was based on evidence showing that extraneous factors may undermine the correct use of the term; the point being that you can substitute concepts if you know how to control for the influence of these factors.
Your premise, that there’s “hidden meaning,” hasn’t been confirmed. As you realize, no one has “unpacked” “real.” It’s because your premise is false.