And, yes, we were talking about definitions: I wanted to make sure I understood what you were actually saying before I tried to respond to it.
Instead, can you tell me what you think ‘realness’ is, and whether or not you think God is real, and why or why not?
I think we label something a “real X” to assert that it implements a deep structure that characterizes X, rather than merely having a superficial appearance of X.
For doing that to be meaningful we have to be prepared to cash it out in terms of the deep structure we’re asserting; if we can’t do that then we don’t mean anything by the phrase “real X.”
When someone says “Y is real,” I try to interpret that to mean “Y is [a real X]” for some plausible X. If someone says “The elephant I’m seeing is real,” I probably understand them to refer to (I1) a real elephant, which implies that it has mass and occupies volume and reflects light and radiates heat and so forth.
If they mean I1, and it turns out that what they are seeing doesn’t have those properties, then they are wrong. If they meant, instead, that it is (I2) a real activation of their retina, then questions of mass and volume are irrelevant… but if it turns out their retina isn’t being activated, then they’re wrong. If they mean, instead, that it’s (I3) a real activation of their visual cortex, then questions of retinal activation are irrelevant… but if it turns out that their visual cortex isn’t being activated, then they’re wrong.
Regardless of whether they’re right or wrong, these are all different claims, even though the same words are being used to express them. If they mean I3 and I understand I2, communication has failed.
If I’ve understood you: if I say “God is real,” you understand that to mean (J1) my neurons are being activated. And J1 is certainly true. But if I meant to express something else (J2) which implies the entity responsible for the creation of the universe once split the Red Sea in order to allow my ancestors to escape from the Egyptian army, then communication has failed.
Sure, we can get along just fine regardless, as long as we stay pretty vague. I can say “God is real” and you can reply “Yup, he sure is!” and we get lots of social bonding value out of it, but communication has nevertheless failed… unless, of course, our only goal was social bonding in the first place, in which case everything is fine.
So, back to whether I think God is real… I think the thing you’re asking about is real, yes. That is, there exist neurons that get activated when people talk about God, and those activation patterns are kinda-sorta isomorphic to one another.
As for why I think that… I don’t know how to begin answering that question in fewer than a thousand words. I don’t think it’s in the least bit controversial.
But I don’t think that’s what anyone else I’ve ever met would mean by the same question.
OK, I think I’m following you now.
And, yes, we were talking about definitions: I wanted to make sure I understood what you were actually saying before I tried to respond to it.
I think we label something a “real X” to assert that it implements a deep structure that characterizes X, rather than merely having a superficial appearance of X.
For doing that to be meaningful we have to be prepared to cash it out in terms of the deep structure we’re asserting; if we can’t do that then we don’t mean anything by the phrase “real X.”
When someone says “Y is real,” I try to interpret that to mean “Y is [a real X]” for some plausible X. If someone says “The elephant I’m seeing is real,” I probably understand them to refer to (I1) a real elephant, which implies that it has mass and occupies volume and reflects light and radiates heat and so forth.
If they mean I1, and it turns out that what they are seeing doesn’t have those properties, then they are wrong. If they meant, instead, that it is (I2) a real activation of their retina, then questions of mass and volume are irrelevant… but if it turns out their retina isn’t being activated, then they’re wrong. If they mean, instead, that it’s (I3) a real activation of their visual cortex, then questions of retinal activation are irrelevant… but if it turns out that their visual cortex isn’t being activated, then they’re wrong.
Regardless of whether they’re right or wrong, these are all different claims, even though the same words are being used to express them. If they mean I3 and I understand I2, communication has failed.
If I’ve understood you: if I say “God is real,” you understand that to mean (J1) my neurons are being activated. And J1 is certainly true. But if I meant to express something else (J2) which implies the entity responsible for the creation of the universe once split the Red Sea in order to allow my ancestors to escape from the Egyptian army, then communication has failed.
Sure, we can get along just fine regardless, as long as we stay pretty vague. I can say “God is real” and you can reply “Yup, he sure is!” and we get lots of social bonding value out of it, but communication has nevertheless failed… unless, of course, our only goal was social bonding in the first place, in which case everything is fine.
So, back to whether I think God is real… I think the thing you’re asking about is real, yes. That is, there exist neurons that get activated when people talk about God, and those activation patterns are kinda-sorta isomorphic to one another.
As for why I think that… I don’t know how to begin answering that question in fewer than a thousand words. I don’t think it’s in the least bit controversial.
But I don’t think that’s what anyone else I’ve ever met would mean by the same question.